- Renamed the password-setup webhook (email_webhook.*, /system/email-webhook-config)
and made it the single transport for all notification emails.
- New webhook_email_service.py shared by password_setup_service and
notification_service.
- Wired test validated/rejected, campaign completed, and new-MITRE-technique
notifications through the webhook (previously dead SMTP code, never triggered).
- Added POST /system/email-webhook-test to send a real test email.
- Hid the Email/SMTP settings tab from the UI (SMTP code kept intact, unused).
- Redact email_webhook.api_key on config export.
_REDACTED_KEYS listed jira.api_token/jira.password/tempo.api_token, but
routers/system.py actually writes admin credentials under
jira.admin_api_token and tempo.admin_token. The mismatch meant every
config export bundle included the live Jira and Tempo admin API tokens
in plaintext instead of redacting them. Found while researching the
Jira/Tempo integration for a service-account request; added a
regression test.
- config.py: move REPORT_OUTPUT_DIR from /tmp (world-writable) to /app/reports
to prevent CWE-377 symlink attack vector (B108, only real security issue)
- main.py: log startup seed failures instead of silently swallowing them (B110)
- Add # nosec annotations to intentional try/except patterns that are by design:
Jira integration errors, email failures, DetachedInstanceError, storage errors,
and Jira session timeout (all B110/B112 false positives)
- Add # nosec B105 to false positives where bandit misidentifies config key
names and masking strings as hardcoded passwords
- Add .bandit config to skip B311 in seed_demo.py (random used for fake
demo data generation, not cryptographic purposes)
kitos