Problem: 15-minute tokens with no refresh mechanism kicked users to login
even when actively using the app.
Fixes:
1. config.py: raise ACCESS_TOKEN_EXPIRE_MINUTES from 15 → 480 (8h).
Reasonable for an enterprise internal tool; still configurable via env.
2. POST /auth/refresh: new endpoint that reads the current aegis_token
cookie and issues a fresh token if the session is still valid. Returns
the new token in the cookie + body (same shape as /auth/login).
3. frontend/api/client.ts: response interceptor now attempts a silent
refresh on 401 before redirecting to login:
- Calls POST /auth/refresh once per failed request
- If refresh succeeds: retries the original request transparently
- If refresh fails: redirects to /login as before
- Deduplicates concurrent refresh attempts (refresh once, resolve all)
- Never attempts refresh on /auth/refresh or /auth/login themselves
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
- auth: desacopla SECURE_COOKIES de AEGIS_ENV para que el login
funcione sobre HTTP (SECURE_COOKIES=false en servidor local)
- TechniqueCell: button -> Link para href real (right-click, a11y)
- TechniquesPage: añade Link en celda MITRE ID en vista lista
- nginx CSP: amplía connect-src con ws:/wss: para evitar bloqueos
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
Revoke tokens by jti in a dedicated Redis DB, honor TTL from JWT exp on logout, reject revoked tokens in get_current_user, and add FakeRedis-backed API tests.
- Add must_change_password field to User model with migration b023
- Add POST /auth/change-password endpoint with password policy validation
- Add require_password_changed dependency to block requests until password is changed
- Add ChangePasswordModal with live password policy checklist (forced on first login)
- Show password policy in CreateUserModal and EditUserModal
- Fix backend permissions: tests, campaigns, templates, reports, evidence, worklogs
- red_tech/blue_tech: execute only, cannot create tests/campaigns/templates
- red_lead/blue_lead: create/edit tests/campaigns/templates, generate reports, no system access
- viewer: read-only everywhere, can generate reports
- Fix frontend role checks across TestDetailPage, TestDetailHeader, TeamTabs, TestsPage, CampaignsPage, CampaignDetailPage, Sidebar
Foundational changes required before any new feature work can begin.
- 0.1 Redis infrastructure: add redis:7-alpine to docker-compose dev and prod,
REDIS_URL config, singleton client in app/infrastructure/redis_client.py
- 0.2 Token blacklist on Redis SEC-001: replace in-memory dict with Redis SETEX
keyed by jti, auto-expiring TTL derived from token exp
- 0.3 Database indexes SR-006: Alembic migration b019 with 5 composite indexes
for scoring, MTTD/MTTR, remediation, and notification queries
- 0.4 Domain exceptions TD-003: app/domain/exceptions.py with typed errors,
error_handler middleware mapping them to HTTP, services decoupled from FastAPI
- 0.5 Fix silenced exceptions TD-007: replace 4 bare except-pass blocks in
test_workflow_service with logger.warning with exc_info
- 0.6 CI pipeline TD-009: GitHub Actions workflow with Postgres and Redis
service containers, ruff lint, pytest; ruff.toml for baseline config
Critical (1-3):
- Replace hardcoded admin credentials with secure auto-generation (seed.py)
- Enforce SECRET_KEY configuration, fail in production if missing (config.py)
- Add Zip Slip and Zip Bomb protection to all ZIP import services
High/Medium (4-9):
- Add 50MB file size limit and extension whitelist to evidence uploads
- Configure CORS origins via environment variable instead of hardcoded
- Migrate JWT storage from localStorage to HttpOnly cookies (frontend+backend)
- Add rate limiting (5/min) on login endpoint via slowapi
- Replace generic dict payloads with Pydantic schemas (mass assignment)
Medium (10-17):
- Check is_active on login to prevent disabled users from authenticating
- Sanitize exception messages in API responses (system, data_sources)
- Escape LIKE wildcards in all ilike search filters across 8 routers
- Run Docker container as non-root user (appuser)
- Make MINIO_SECURE configurable via environment variable
- Add password complexity policy (12+ chars, upper/lower/digit/special)
- Implement JWT token revocation via in-memory blacklist + reduce TTL to 15min
- Replace xml.etree with defusedxml to prevent Billion Laughs attacks
Low (18-20):
- Add security headers to Nginx (CSP, X-Frame-Options, HSTS-ready, etc.)
- Disable Swagger UI/ReDoc/OpenAPI in production
- Restrict /health endpoint to internal networks via Nginx ACL
Also: rewrite install.sh as interactive wizard for guided deployment,
fix test-from-template validation error (technique_id UUID vs MITRE ID)
