Login is now by email, not username. username still exists internally
(JWT sub claim, audit logs, Jira actor attribution, SSO provisioning all
still key off it) but is now always kept equal to email everywhere a user
is created or their email changes — never a separately-chosen value.
- User.email is now unique + NOT NULL (migration b067 backfills any
missing/blank email from username first, so existing rows — notably
the seeded admin, which historically had none — never violate it).
- /auth/login and the (unused but updated for consistency)
authenticate_user() now query by email.
- create_user (legacy, unreferenced but kept) and
create_user_without_password both derive username from email.
- update_user keeps username in sync when email changes, and rejects
duplicate emails.
- seed.py reads ADMIN_EMAIL (new env var, wired through install.sh and
docker-compose.prod.yml) for the initial admin; falls back to an
email-shaped ADMIN_USERNAME or a placeholder that's flagged for the
operator to fix.
- admin_config.py's import bundle now matches/creates users by email,
skipping (not crashing on) entries with no email.
- sso_service.py always sets username = email for SSO-provisioned users.
- LoginPage/auth.ts updated to email input/copy (wire field name stays
'username' — that's the OAuth2PasswordRequestForm spec, not the value).
The previous fix defaulted PLATFORM_URL to this deployment's own domain
directly in docker-compose.prod.yml — any other deployment of this repo
would silently inherit it if they forgot to set their own. Now there is
no default at all: the compose file requires the env var to be set, and
the backend refuses to start in production if PLATFORM_URL still equals
the dev value, mirroring the existing SECRET_KEY enforcement.
Set-password links in every password-setup/reset email pointed at
http://localhost:5173 in production because PLATFORM_URL was never mapped
in docker-compose.prod.yml's backend environment block — the app silently
used its dev default. Now defaults to the real domain from CORS_ORIGINS.
Jira — PoC custom field:
- Add customfield_10309 (Proof of Concept) to issue fields when creating
test tickets so the attack procedure appears in the dedicated Jira field
Tempo — blue team exclusion:
- Remove blue_team_evaluation from _TEMPO_ACTIVITY_TYPES; blue team time
is tracked internally (worklogs) for SLA but never sent to Tempo since
blue team has no Jira access
Evidence — uploaded_at NULL fix:
- Set uploaded_at=datetime.utcnow() explicitly in upload_evidence router;
the DB column has no server default so it was saving as NULL
Evidence — presigned URL browser access:
- Add MINIO_PUBLIC_ENDPOINT setting (config.py, docker-compose.prod.yml)
- storage.py uses a dedicated _public_client for presigned URL generation
so browsers receive URLs with the publicly accessible hostname instead of
the internal Docker service name (minio:9000)
- Expose MinIO port 9000 in docker-compose.prod.yml
Evidence — Jira attachment:
- After upload to MinIO, call jira.add_attachment() to attach the file to
the linked Jira ticket (non-fatal; errors are logged and swallowed)
Settings — hide Jira/Tempo from blue team:
- ProfileSection checks user role; blue_lead and blue_tech do not see the
Jira Integration or Tempo Integration personal settings sections
Jira URL fix:
- JiraLinkPanel now fetches the configured Jira base URL via getJiraConfig()
instead of hardcoding https://jira.atlassian.com; falls back to the old
value if config is not yet loaded
Description fix:
- _build_test_description: renamed 'h3. Procedure' -> 'h3. Proof of Concept'
so the procedure/tool block maps to the correct Jira field label
Tempo debug:
- New POST /system/tempo-test endpoint: checks TEMPO_ENABLED, token,
user jira_account_id, and makes a real API call; always returns HTTP 200
with status field (Cloudflare-safe)
- docker-compose.prod.yml: added TEMPO_ENABLED, TEMPO_API_TOKEN,
TEMPO_DEFAULT_WORK_TYPE env vars (default off, ready to enable)
- SettingsPage: added 'Test Tempo Connection' button in Jira admin tab
with clear feedback showing what's missing
Add Redis 7 to Docker Compose with healthcheck and persistence, separate logical DBs for blacklist and cache, singleton redis client helpers, and unit tests with fakeredis.
Foundational changes required before any new feature work can begin.
- 0.1 Redis infrastructure: add redis:7-alpine to docker-compose dev and prod,
REDIS_URL config, singleton client in app/infrastructure/redis_client.py
- 0.2 Token blacklist on Redis SEC-001: replace in-memory dict with Redis SETEX
keyed by jti, auto-expiring TTL derived from token exp
- 0.3 Database indexes SR-006: Alembic migration b019 with 5 composite indexes
for scoring, MTTD/MTTR, remediation, and notification queries
- 0.4 Domain exceptions TD-003: app/domain/exceptions.py with typed errors,
error_handler middleware mapping them to HTTP, services decoupled from FastAPI
- 0.5 Fix silenced exceptions TD-007: replace 4 bare except-pass blocks in
test_workflow_service with logger.warning with exc_info
- 0.6 CI pipeline TD-009: GitHub Actions workflow with Postgres and Redis
service containers, ruff lint, pytest; ruff.toml for baseline config
Critical (1-3):
- Replace hardcoded admin credentials with secure auto-generation (seed.py)
- Enforce SECRET_KEY configuration, fail in production if missing (config.py)
- Add Zip Slip and Zip Bomb protection to all ZIP import services
High/Medium (4-9):
- Add 50MB file size limit and extension whitelist to evidence uploads
- Configure CORS origins via environment variable instead of hardcoded
- Migrate JWT storage from localStorage to HttpOnly cookies (frontend+backend)
- Add rate limiting (5/min) on login endpoint via slowapi
- Replace generic dict payloads with Pydantic schemas (mass assignment)
Medium (10-17):
- Check is_active on login to prevent disabled users from authenticating
- Sanitize exception messages in API responses (system, data_sources)
- Escape LIKE wildcards in all ilike search filters across 8 routers
- Run Docker container as non-root user (appuser)
- Make MINIO_SECURE configurable via environment variable
- Add password complexity policy (12+ chars, upper/lower/digit/special)
- Implement JWT token revocation via in-memory blacklist + reduce TTL to 15min
- Replace xml.etree with defusedxml to prevent Billion Laughs attacks
Low (18-20):
- Add security headers to Nginx (CSP, X-Frame-Options, HSTS-ready, etc.)
- Disable Swagger UI/ReDoc/OpenAPI in production
- Restrict /health endpoint to internal networks via Nginx ACL
Also: rewrite install.sh as interactive wizard for guided deployment,
fix test-from-template validation error (technique_id UUID vs MITRE ID)
- Fix hardcoded localhost:8000 URLs in frontend to use relative /api/v1
path (works with Nginx proxy in prod and VITE_API_URL in dev)
- Create production entrypoint (entrypoint.prod.sh) that runs migrations,
seeds, and starts uvicorn with 4 workers (no --reload)
- Create comprehensive install.sh script for production deployment that
generates secure .env, builds containers, waits for health, and
optionally triggers initial MITRE sync
- Update docker-compose.prod.yml to use production entrypoint
- Update Dockerfile to make both entrypoints executable
- Remove init.ps1 (production will always be Linux)
- Update README with production deployment instructions
- Update docker-compose.yml with frontend service and healthchecks
- Add frontend Dockerfile with dev and production stages
- Add nginx.conf for production frontend serving
- Add docker-compose.prod.yml for production deployment
- Add .env.example with all configuration options
- Add init scripts (init.sh, init.ps1) for easy setup
kitos
kitos