Commit Graph

20 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
kitos
43ef4ea6a0 test(qa): add automated QA runner for all roles and access control
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2026-05-22 10:30:54 +02:00
kitos
6f4901b611 security: fix 6 vulnerabilities identified in SDLC audit
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- fix(auth): enforce API key scopes in require_role/require_any_role;
  attach _api_key_scopes to user on API key auth; add require_scope()
  dependency — scopes were stored but never enforced (CWE-285)

- fix(sso): read SECURE_COOKIES env var for SSO cookie instead of
  hardcoded secure=False — SAML sessions now respect HTTPS config (CWE-614)

- fix(webhooks): SSRF prevention — validate webhook URLs against private
  and reserved CIDRs at creation/update time (CWE-918)

- fix(knowledge): restrict playbook/lesson create, update and restore
  to admin/red_lead/blue_lead roles — was open to any authenticated user (CWE-284)

- fix(alerts): restrict alert acknowledge/resolve/dismiss to admin/lead
  roles — any user could silence security alerts (CWE-284)

- security: delete get_admin_creds.py, check_auth.py, deploy.py scripts
  containing hardcoded root SSH credentials and production DB access;
  add scripts/.gitignore to prevent reintroduction (CWE-798)
2026-05-22 09:46:29 +02:00
kitos
f36c633d16 fix(scripts): fix verify_gaps.py Gap 1 check — call start_scheduler() before checking registered jobs
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2026-05-21 17:28:34 +02:00
kitos
d05aa94a01 test: gap verification script for Phase 13 gaps
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2026-05-21 16:08:45 +02:00
kitos
d4b147da7c feat(alerts): Phase 13 — Operational Alert Engine
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AlertRule + AlertInstance models (b041alerts migration), 8 pre-seeded system
rules (high_risk x2, stale_technique, coverage_regression, low_coverage,
expiry_wave, new_technique, orphan_spike), evaluation engine with per-rule
cooldown, full alert lifecycle (acknowledge/resolve/dismiss), custom rule CRUD,
and summary endpoint. Rules seeded at app startup.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-21 15:25:55 +02:00
kitos
d81fc04b8f feat(enterprise): Phase 14 — API Key Management + SSO/SAML 2.0
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- ApiKey model (SHA-256 hash, prefix, scopes, expiry) + Alembic migration (b040ent)
- SsoConfig model for SAML 2.0 IdP settings (attribute mapping, auto-provision)
- API key auth integrated into get_current_user (aegis_ prefix detection)
- Routers: /api/v1/api-keys (full CRUD + revoke) and /api/v1/sso (metadata, login, callback, config)
- python3-saml added to requirements; Dockerfile adds libxmlsec1-dev for SAML XML signing
- QA script: 52 assertions covering key lifecycle, API key auth, SSO config

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-20 16:43:57 +02:00
kitos
ab591d30c4 feat(dashboard): Phase 13 — Executive Dashboard
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PostureSnapshot model, Alembic migration (b039exec), schemas, service
aggregating all phases (coverage/risk/operations/knowledge/MTTD), and
router at /api/v1/dashboard with executive view, KPIs, coverage-by-tactic,
posture-history, posture-snapshot, and activity-feed endpoints.

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-20 16:20:21 +02:00
kitos
362a17aa1b feat(risk): Phase 12 — Risk Intelligence [FASE-12]
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- TechniqueRiskProfile model: per-technique risk scoring (0-100)
- 4-factor weighted scoring: detection_gap(35%) + threat_actors(30%) + osint(20%) + test_failures(15%)
- Risk levels: critical(≥75) / high(≥50) / medium(≥25) / low(≥10) / info
- Detailed scoring_breakdown (JSONB) + actionable recommendations per technique
- Router /api/v1/risk: compute-all, compute-one, list, matrix, summary, recommendations, top
- Alembic migration b038risk (raw SQL, idempotent)
- QA script: 60+ tests across all endpoints

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-20 15:31:38 +02:00
kitos
0febbc67f1 fix(qa11): use relative version checks for idempotent runs
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2026-05-20 15:26:38 +02:00
kitos
852adb6e4d fix(qa11): make QA idempotent with cleanup step + robust error handling
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2026-05-20 15:25:46 +02:00
kitos
9546ef8bc8 fix(qa11): use correct production credentials
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2026-05-20 15:14:58 +02:00
kitos
e550ebb30f fix(qa11): use production admin credentials
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2026-05-20 14:31:46 +02:00
kitos
5e18db48d3 fix(qa11): fix get_token to use form data + fix check() bug
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2026-05-20 14:27:41 +02:00
kitos
4f5370db89 feat(knowledge): Phase 11 — Knowledge Management (Playbooks + Lessons Learned) [FASE-11]
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- Playbooks: versioned Markdown runbooks per technique × type (attack/detect/investigate/respond/hunt)
- PlaybookVersion: immutable snapshots on every update; restore to any previous version
- LessonLearned: post-mortem records linked to tests/campaigns/attack-paths or manual
- Alembic migration b037know (raw SQL, idempotent, no PostgreSQL enums)
- Router /api/v1/knowledge: 14 endpoints for playbooks + lessons + stats
- Pydantic validators for playbook_type, severity, entity_type (422 on invalid)
- Knowledge stats endpoint: totals + breakdown by severity and playbook type
- Soft-delete on both resources; include_inactive filter for admin recovery
- QA script: 70+ tests across CRUD, versioning, filtering, auth, soft-delete, regression

Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
2026-05-20 13:39:05 +02:00
f41b8fd8c2 fix(security): add username validation, constant-time login, default credential rejection, and tooling 2026-02-18 19:11:14 +01:00
64d64080e0 fix: resolve 20 security vulnerabilities from comprehensive audit
Critical (1-3):
- Replace hardcoded admin credentials with secure auto-generation (seed.py)
- Enforce SECRET_KEY configuration, fail in production if missing (config.py)
- Add Zip Slip and Zip Bomb protection to all ZIP import services

High/Medium (4-9):
- Add 50MB file size limit and extension whitelist to evidence uploads
- Configure CORS origins via environment variable instead of hardcoded
- Migrate JWT storage from localStorage to HttpOnly cookies (frontend+backend)
- Add rate limiting (5/min) on login endpoint via slowapi
- Replace generic dict payloads with Pydantic schemas (mass assignment)

Medium (10-17):
- Check is_active on login to prevent disabled users from authenticating
- Sanitize exception messages in API responses (system, data_sources)
- Escape LIKE wildcards in all ilike search filters across 8 routers
- Run Docker container as non-root user (appuser)
- Make MINIO_SECURE configurable via environment variable
- Add password complexity policy (12+ chars, upper/lower/digit/special)
- Implement JWT token revocation via in-memory blacklist + reduce TTL to 15min
- Replace xml.etree with defusedxml to prevent Billion Laughs attacks

Low (18-20):
- Add security headers to Nginx (CSP, X-Frame-Options, HSTS-ready, etc.)
- Disable Swagger UI/ReDoc/OpenAPI in production
- Restrict /health endpoint to internal networks via Nginx ACL

Also: rewrite install.sh as interactive wizard for guided deployment,
fix test-from-template validation error (technique_id UUID vs MITRE ID)
2026-02-11 08:56:26 +01:00
cc0bbdf797 fix: auto-detect Docker API version to avoid client/server mismatch 2026-02-10 16:14:21 +01:00
de6f3fbea4 fix: install script cd to project root and improve error handling
- Auto-detect project root from script location so it works from any dir
- Fail properly if docker-compose build fails (was hidden by pipe)
- Use docker exec for backend health checks (port 8000 not exposed in prod)
- Add fallback API access via docker exec if nginx not reachable yet
- Show backend logs during wait for better debugging
- Increase timeouts for MITRE sync and data source sync
2026-02-10 16:10:09 +01:00
8aec3581a0 feat: production deployment setup and hardcoded URL fixes
- Fix hardcoded localhost:8000 URLs in frontend to use relative /api/v1
  path (works with Nginx proxy in prod and VITE_API_URL in dev)
- Create production entrypoint (entrypoint.prod.sh) that runs migrations,
  seeds, and starts uvicorn with 4 workers (no --reload)
- Create comprehensive install.sh script for production deployment that
  generates secure .env, builds containers, waits for health, and
  optionally triggers initial MITRE sync
- Update docker-compose.prod.yml to use production entrypoint
- Update Dockerfile to make both entrypoints executable
- Remove init.ps1 (production will always be Linux)
- Update README with production deployment instructions
2026-02-10 16:04:16 +01:00
ce46314afb feat: add complete Docker setup for testing
- Update docker-compose.yml with frontend service and healthchecks

- Add frontend Dockerfile with dev and production stages

- Add nginx.conf for production frontend serving

- Add docker-compose.prod.yml for production deployment

- Add .env.example with all configuration options

- Add init scripts (init.sh, init.ps1) for easy setup
2026-02-06 16:33:22 +01:00