Admin administers the site — it no longer has any override on
validate-red/blue, review-red/blue, resolve-dispute, request-discussion,
reopen, hold, resume, assign-operators, or classification-update.
Introduces require_any_role_strict(), a role dependency without the
global admin bypass, so these specific endpoints truly exclude admin
instead of only removing it from the (redundant) role tuple.
Managers gain the ability to assign red_tech/blue_tech operators
(POST /tests/{id}/assign, GET /users/operators) alongside leads, since
that's coordination, not resolving a ticket.
Also enlarges and repositions the operator-assignment controls next
to the Start Execution button, and fixes a literal '\u2014' rendering
as text instead of an em dash in the test detail technique line.
Snyk scan found 3 High severity vulns: two in ecdsa (pulled by python-jose)
and one in diskcache (pulled by pySigma, never imported). Remove both
vulnerable dependencies and migrate JWT handling to PyJWT. Fix
test_logout_revokes_token which broke because test stubs sys.modules[jose]
with a MagicMock at collection time; test now uses PyJWT directly.
Task D — Google-style docstrings (Args/Returns) on every public function,
method, and class across all 158 Python files in the backend. Zero ruff D
violations (pydocstyle Google convention).
Task E — Explanatory one-line comment before every code line (~11600 new
comments). ruff check passes clean after isort re-sort.
- fix(auth): enforce API key scopes in require_role/require_any_role;
attach _api_key_scopes to user on API key auth; add require_scope()
dependency — scopes were stored but never enforced (CWE-285)
- fix(sso): read SECURE_COOKIES env var for SSO cookie instead of
hardcoded secure=False — SAML sessions now respect HTTPS config (CWE-614)
- fix(webhooks): SSRF prevention — validate webhook URLs against private
and reserved CIDRs at creation/update time (CWE-918)
- fix(knowledge): restrict playbook/lesson create, update and restore
to admin/red_lead/blue_lead roles — was open to any authenticated user (CWE-284)
- fix(alerts): restrict alert acknowledge/resolve/dismiss to admin/lead
roles — any user could silence security alerts (CWE-284)
- security: delete get_admin_creds.py, check_auth.py, deploy.py scripts
containing hardcoded root SSH credentials and production DB access;
add scripts/.gitignore to prevent reintroduction (CWE-798)
Revoke tokens by jti in a dedicated Redis DB, honor TTL from JWT exp on logout, reject revoked tokens in get_current_user, and add FakeRedis-backed API tests.
- Add must_change_password field to User model with migration b023
- Add POST /auth/change-password endpoint with password policy validation
- Add require_password_changed dependency to block requests until password is changed
- Add ChangePasswordModal with live password policy checklist (forced on first login)
- Show password policy in CreateUserModal and EditUserModal
- Fix backend permissions: tests, campaigns, templates, reports, evidence, worklogs
- red_tech/blue_tech: execute only, cannot create tests/campaigns/templates
- red_lead/blue_lead: create/edit tests/campaigns/templates, generate reports, no system access
- viewer: read-only everywhere, can generate reports
- Fix frontend role checks across TestDetailPage, TestDetailHeader, TeamTabs, TestsPage, CampaignsPage, CampaignDetailPage, Sidebar
Critical (1-3):
- Replace hardcoded admin credentials with secure auto-generation (seed.py)
- Enforce SECRET_KEY configuration, fail in production if missing (config.py)
- Add Zip Slip and Zip Bomb protection to all ZIP import services
High/Medium (4-9):
- Add 50MB file size limit and extension whitelist to evidence uploads
- Configure CORS origins via environment variable instead of hardcoded
- Migrate JWT storage from localStorage to HttpOnly cookies (frontend+backend)
- Add rate limiting (5/min) on login endpoint via slowapi
- Replace generic dict payloads with Pydantic schemas (mass assignment)
Medium (10-17):
- Check is_active on login to prevent disabled users from authenticating
- Sanitize exception messages in API responses (system, data_sources)
- Escape LIKE wildcards in all ilike search filters across 8 routers
- Run Docker container as non-root user (appuser)
- Make MINIO_SECURE configurable via environment variable
- Add password complexity policy (12+ chars, upper/lower/digit/special)
- Implement JWT token revocation via in-memory blacklist + reduce TTL to 15min
- Replace xml.etree with defusedxml to prevent Billion Laughs attacks
Low (18-20):
- Add security headers to Nginx (CSP, X-Frame-Options, HSTS-ready, etc.)
- Disable Swagger UI/ReDoc/OpenAPI in production
- Restrict /health endpoint to internal networks via Nginx ACL
Also: rewrite install.sh as interactive wizard for guided deployment,
fix test-from-template validation error (technique_id UUID vs MITRE ID)
- Add Pydantic schemas for Technique, Test and Evidence
- Add CRUD endpoints for Techniques (list with filters, detail, create, update, review)
- Add CRUD endpoints for Tests (create, detail, update, validate, reject)
- Add evidence upload with SHA-256 integrity and presigned download URLs
- Add MinIO/S3 storage client with bucket auto-creation on startup
- Add status_service to recalculate technique coverage from test results
- Add require_any_role RBAC dependency for multi-role authorization
- Update README with API endpoints reference and project structure
kitos
kitos