Commit Graph

8 Commits

Author SHA1 Message Date
6b076f52b2 feat(auth): audit login success and failure attempts [FASE-3.2] 2026-05-18 14:16:53 +02:00
c5eb6f6dc1 feat(auth): move JWT blacklist to Redis with TTL [FASE-0.2]
Revoke tokens by jti in a dedicated Redis DB, honor TTL from JWT exp on logout, reject revoked tokens in get_current_user, and add FakeRedis-backed API tests.
2026-05-18 13:19:15 +02:00
9e22fde746 feat: extract advanced_metrics, analytics, test_templates, and auth to services (Tier 1 complete) 2026-02-20 14:28:52 +01:00
f41b8fd8c2 fix(security): add username validation, constant-time login, default credential rejection, and tooling 2026-02-18 19:11:14 +01:00
a4a2adccee feat(phase-39): role-based access control overhaul + forced password change
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- Add must_change_password field to User model with migration b023

- Add POST /auth/change-password endpoint with password policy validation

- Add require_password_changed dependency to block requests until password is changed

- Add ChangePasswordModal with live password policy checklist (forced on first login)

- Show password policy in CreateUserModal and EditUserModal

- Fix backend permissions: tests, campaigns, templates, reports, evidence, worklogs

- red_tech/blue_tech: execute only, cannot create tests/campaigns/templates

- red_lead/blue_lead: create/edit tests/campaigns/templates, generate reports, no system access

- viewer: read-only everywhere, can generate reports

- Fix frontend role checks across TestDetailPage, TestDetailHeader, TeamTabs, TestsPage, CampaignsPage, CampaignDetailPage, Sidebar
2026-02-18 10:37:02 +01:00
6d18a5417d feat(phase-34): resolve blocking tech debt — Redis, domain exceptions, indexes, CI
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Foundational changes required before any new feature work can begin.

- 0.1 Redis infrastructure: add redis:7-alpine to docker-compose dev and prod,
  REDIS_URL config, singleton client in app/infrastructure/redis_client.py
- 0.2 Token blacklist on Redis SEC-001: replace in-memory dict with Redis SETEX
  keyed by jti, auto-expiring TTL derived from token exp
- 0.3 Database indexes SR-006: Alembic migration b019 with 5 composite indexes
  for scoring, MTTD/MTTR, remediation, and notification queries
- 0.4 Domain exceptions TD-003: app/domain/exceptions.py with typed errors,
  error_handler middleware mapping them to HTTP, services decoupled from FastAPI
- 0.5 Fix silenced exceptions TD-007: replace 4 bare except-pass blocks in
  test_workflow_service with logger.warning with exc_info
- 0.6 CI pipeline TD-009: GitHub Actions workflow with Postgres and Redis
  service containers, ruff lint, pytest; ruff.toml for baseline config
2026-02-17 15:43:05 +01:00
64d64080e0 fix: resolve 20 security vulnerabilities from comprehensive audit
Critical (1-3):
- Replace hardcoded admin credentials with secure auto-generation (seed.py)
- Enforce SECRET_KEY configuration, fail in production if missing (config.py)
- Add Zip Slip and Zip Bomb protection to all ZIP import services

High/Medium (4-9):
- Add 50MB file size limit and extension whitelist to evidence uploads
- Configure CORS origins via environment variable instead of hardcoded
- Migrate JWT storage from localStorage to HttpOnly cookies (frontend+backend)
- Add rate limiting (5/min) on login endpoint via slowapi
- Replace generic dict payloads with Pydantic schemas (mass assignment)

Medium (10-17):
- Check is_active on login to prevent disabled users from authenticating
- Sanitize exception messages in API responses (system, data_sources)
- Escape LIKE wildcards in all ilike search filters across 8 routers
- Run Docker container as non-root user (appuser)
- Make MINIO_SECURE configurable via environment variable
- Add password complexity policy (12+ chars, upper/lower/digit/special)
- Implement JWT token revocation via in-memory blacklist + reduce TTL to 15min
- Replace xml.etree with defusedxml to prevent Billion Laughs attacks

Low (18-20):
- Add security headers to Nginx (CSP, X-Frame-Options, HSTS-ready, etc.)
- Disable Swagger UI/ReDoc/OpenAPI in production
- Restrict /health endpoint to internal networks via Nginx ACL

Also: rewrite install.sh as interactive wizard for guided deployment,
fix test-from-template validation error (technique_id UUID vs MITRE ID)
2026-02-11 08:56:26 +01:00
508f0723af feat: Phase 2 - Authentication and authorization (T-010 to T-013) 2026-02-06 13:15:25 +01:00