Login is now by email, not username. username still exists internally
(JWT sub claim, audit logs, Jira actor attribution, SSO provisioning all
still key off it) but is now always kept equal to email everywhere a user
is created or their email changes — never a separately-chosen value.
- User.email is now unique + NOT NULL (migration b067 backfills any
missing/blank email from username first, so existing rows — notably
the seeded admin, which historically had none — never violate it).
- /auth/login and the (unused but updated for consistency)
authenticate_user() now query by email.
- create_user (legacy, unreferenced but kept) and
create_user_without_password both derive username from email.
- update_user keeps username in sync when email changes, and rejects
duplicate emails.
- seed.py reads ADMIN_EMAIL (new env var, wired through install.sh and
docker-compose.prod.yml) for the initial admin; falls back to an
email-shaped ADMIN_USERNAME or a placeholder that's flagged for the
operator to fix.
- admin_config.py's import bundle now matches/creates users by email,
skipping (not crashing on) entries with no email.
- sso_service.py always sets username = email for SSO-provisioned users.
- LoginPage/auth.ts updated to email input/copy (wire field name stays
'username' — that's the OAuth2PasswordRequestForm spec, not the value).
Fresh installs failed at 'docker compose up' with 'required variable
PLATFORM_URL is missing a value' — the install script computes ORIGIN_URL
for CORS_ORIGINS already but never wrote PLATFORM_URL, which the backend
now requires with no default. Also backfills it into an existing .env
(from CORS_ORIGINS) when the user chooses to keep their current config,
so upgrading an older install in place doesn't hit the same error.
Tar Slip (CWE-22) — 3 import services:
threat_actor, lolbas, caldera: add path validation before extractall()
to prevent malicious zip members with ../ escaping the target directory.
(sigma, elastic, atomic already had this protection)
Path Traversal (CWE-23) — professional_reports.py:
Add _assert_safe_report_path() check on all 5 report endpoints to
verify the generated filepath stays within REPORT_OUTPUT_DIR.
Open Redirect (CWE-601) — sso.py:
Validate IdP redirect URL scheme (must be http/https) before
issuing RedirectResponse, blocking javascript: and data: redirects.
DOM XSS (CWE-79) — 4 frontend pages:
Create src/utils/url.ts with safeUrl() that rejects non-http/https
protocols; apply to actor.mitre_url, ref.url, intel.url.
Sanitize framework name to alphanumeric-only before DOM insertion.
Restrict evidence MIME types to an explicit safe allowlist (png/jpg/gif/webp).
Hardcoded credentials (CWE-798):
verify_gaps.py, create_wiki.py: replace literal passwords with
environment variable reads (AEGIS_ADMIN_PASSWORD, GITEA_PASSWORD).
When the wizard reconfigures and generates a new DB_PASSWORD, the existing
Postgres volume retains the old password (Docker only initializes credentials
on a fresh empty volume). The backend then fails to connect because .env
has the new password but Postgres still uses the old one.
Fix: run 'docker compose down -v' before 'up --build' whenever the wizard
reconfigures (SKIP_CONFIG=false), so Postgres always initializes with the
current .env credentials. Also add a pre-confirmation warning when existing
volumes are detected.
Creates 14 comprehensive wiki pages covering architecture, roles,
test lifecycle, API reference, security, deployment, and QA guide.
Run from a machine with access to internal Gitea (192.168.1.107:3000).
- Accept 409 for playbook creation (unique per technique+type is correct behavior)
- Space logins 13s apart to avoid 5/min rate limit on login endpoint
- Reuse admin session from initial login to avoid duplicate login call
fix(qa): pass technique_id and test_id context between test suites
fix(qa): playbook creation requires technique_id field
fix(qa): lesson creation requires what_happened and root_cause fields
fix(qa): campaign complete test now activates with test before completing
fix(qa): rate limit test notes loopback exemption instead of failing
- fix(auth): enforce API key scopes in require_role/require_any_role;
attach _api_key_scopes to user on API key auth; add require_scope()
dependency — scopes were stored but never enforced (CWE-285)
- fix(sso): read SECURE_COOKIES env var for SSO cookie instead of
hardcoded secure=False — SAML sessions now respect HTTPS config (CWE-614)
- fix(webhooks): SSRF prevention — validate webhook URLs against private
and reserved CIDRs at creation/update time (CWE-918)
- fix(knowledge): restrict playbook/lesson create, update and restore
to admin/red_lead/blue_lead roles — was open to any authenticated user (CWE-284)
- fix(alerts): restrict alert acknowledge/resolve/dismiss to admin/lead
roles — any user could silence security alerts (CWE-284)
- security: delete get_admin_creds.py, check_auth.py, deploy.py scripts
containing hardcoded root SSH credentials and production DB access;
add scripts/.gitignore to prevent reintroduction (CWE-798)
PostureSnapshot model, Alembic migration (b039exec), schemas, service
aggregating all phases (coverage/risk/operations/knowledge/MTTD), and
router at /api/v1/dashboard with executive view, KPIs, coverage-by-tactic,
posture-history, posture-snapshot, and activity-feed endpoints.
- Playbooks: versioned Markdown runbooks per technique × type (attack/detect/investigate/respond/hunt)
- PlaybookVersion: immutable snapshots on every update; restore to any previous version
- LessonLearned: post-mortem records linked to tests/campaigns/attack-paths or manual
- Alembic migration b037know (raw SQL, idempotent, no PostgreSQL enums)
- Router /api/v1/knowledge: 14 endpoints for playbooks + lessons + stats
- Pydantic validators for playbook_type, severity, entity_type (422 on invalid)
- Knowledge stats endpoint: totals + breakdown by severity and playbook type
- Soft-delete on both resources; include_inactive filter for admin recovery
- QA script: 70+ tests across CRUD, versioning, filtering, auth, soft-delete, regression
Critical (1-3):
- Replace hardcoded admin credentials with secure auto-generation (seed.py)
- Enforce SECRET_KEY configuration, fail in production if missing (config.py)
- Add Zip Slip and Zip Bomb protection to all ZIP import services
High/Medium (4-9):
- Add 50MB file size limit and extension whitelist to evidence uploads
- Configure CORS origins via environment variable instead of hardcoded
- Migrate JWT storage from localStorage to HttpOnly cookies (frontend+backend)
- Add rate limiting (5/min) on login endpoint via slowapi
- Replace generic dict payloads with Pydantic schemas (mass assignment)
Medium (10-17):
- Check is_active on login to prevent disabled users from authenticating
- Sanitize exception messages in API responses (system, data_sources)
- Escape LIKE wildcards in all ilike search filters across 8 routers
- Run Docker container as non-root user (appuser)
- Make MINIO_SECURE configurable via environment variable
- Add password complexity policy (12+ chars, upper/lower/digit/special)
- Implement JWT token revocation via in-memory blacklist + reduce TTL to 15min
- Replace xml.etree with defusedxml to prevent Billion Laughs attacks
Low (18-20):
- Add security headers to Nginx (CSP, X-Frame-Options, HSTS-ready, etc.)
- Disable Swagger UI/ReDoc/OpenAPI in production
- Restrict /health endpoint to internal networks via Nginx ACL
Also: rewrite install.sh as interactive wizard for guided deployment,
fix test-from-template validation error (technique_id UUID vs MITRE ID)
- Auto-detect project root from script location so it works from any dir
- Fail properly if docker-compose build fails (was hidden by pipe)
- Use docker exec for backend health checks (port 8000 not exposed in prod)
- Add fallback API access via docker exec if nginx not reachable yet
- Show backend logs during wait for better debugging
- Increase timeouts for MITRE sync and data source sync
- Fix hardcoded localhost:8000 URLs in frontend to use relative /api/v1
path (works with Nginx proxy in prod and VITE_API_URL in dev)
- Create production entrypoint (entrypoint.prod.sh) that runs migrations,
seeds, and starts uvicorn with 4 workers (no --reload)
- Create comprehensive install.sh script for production deployment that
generates secure .env, builds containers, waits for health, and
optionally triggers initial MITRE sync
- Update docker-compose.prod.yml to use production entrypoint
- Update Dockerfile to make both entrypoints executable
- Remove init.ps1 (production will always be Linux)
- Update README with production deployment instructions
- Update docker-compose.yml with frontend service and healthchecks
- Add frontend Dockerfile with dev and production stages
- Add nginx.conf for production frontend serving
- Add docker-compose.prod.yml for production deployment
- Add .env.example with all configuration options
- Add init scripts (init.sh, init.ps1) for easy setup
kitos
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