- fix(auth): enforce API key scopes in require_role/require_any_role;
attach _api_key_scopes to user on API key auth; add require_scope()
dependency — scopes were stored but never enforced (CWE-285)
- fix(sso): read SECURE_COOKIES env var for SSO cookie instead of
hardcoded secure=False — SAML sessions now respect HTTPS config (CWE-614)
- fix(webhooks): SSRF prevention — validate webhook URLs against private
and reserved CIDRs at creation/update time (CWE-918)
- fix(knowledge): restrict playbook/lesson create, update and restore
to admin/red_lead/blue_lead roles — was open to any authenticated user (CWE-284)
- fix(alerts): restrict alert acknowledge/resolve/dismiss to admin/lead
roles — any user could silence security alerts (CWE-284)
- security: delete get_admin_creds.py, check_auth.py, deploy.py scripts
containing hardcoded root SSH credentials and production DB access;
add scripts/.gitignore to prevent reintroduction (CWE-798)
- Playbooks: versioned Markdown runbooks per technique × type (attack/detect/investigate/respond/hunt)
- PlaybookVersion: immutable snapshots on every update; restore to any previous version
- LessonLearned: post-mortem records linked to tests/campaigns/attack-paths or manual
- Alembic migration b037know (raw SQL, idempotent, no PostgreSQL enums)
- Router /api/v1/knowledge: 14 endpoints for playbooks + lessons + stats
- Pydantic validators for playbook_type, severity, entity_type (422 on invalid)
- Knowledge stats endpoint: totals + breakdown by severity and playbook type
- Soft-delete on both resources; include_inactive filter for admin recovery
- QA script: 70+ tests across CRUD, versioning, filtering, auth, soft-delete, regression
Co-Authored-By: Claude Sonnet 4.6 <noreply@anthropic.com>
