fix(security): stop leaking live Jira/Tempo admin tokens in config export

_REDACTED_KEYS listed jira.api_token/jira.password/tempo.api_token, but
routers/system.py actually writes admin credentials under
jira.admin_api_token and tempo.admin_token. The mismatch meant every
config export bundle included the live Jira and Tempo admin API tokens
in plaintext instead of redacting them. Found while researching the
Jira/Tempo integration for a service-account request; added a
regression test.

backend/tests/test_admin_config_export_import.py

@@ -46,6 +46,23 @@ def test_export_config_redacts_smtp_password(client, db, auth_headers):
     assert values["smtp.host"] == "smtp.example.com"
 
 
+def test_export_config_redacts_live_jira_and_tempo_admin_tokens(client, db, auth_headers):
+    """Regression test: the redaction key list previously named
+    jira.api_token/jira.password/tempo.api_token, which don't match the
+    actual keys routers/system.py writes (jira.admin_api_token,
+    tempo.admin_token) — so the live admin Jira/Tempo credentials were
+    exported in plaintext instead of being redacted."""
+    db.add(SystemConfig(key="jira.admin_api_token", value="ATATT-real-jira-token"))
+    db.add(SystemConfig(key="tempo.admin_token", value="real-tempo-token"))
+    db.commit()
+
+    body = client.get("/api/v1/admin/export-config", headers=auth_headers).json()
+    values = {r["key"]: r["value"] for r in body["system_configs"]}
+
+    assert values["jira.admin_api_token"] == "[REDACTED]"
+    assert values["tempo.admin_token"] == "[REDACTED]"
+
+
 def test_export_config_never_exports_sso_private_key(client, db, auth_headers):
     db.add(SsoConfig(is_enabled=True, provider_name="Okta", sp_private_key="super-secret-key"))
     db.commit()