feat(auth): move JWT blacklist to Redis with TTL [FASE-0.2]
Revoke tokens by jti in a dedicated Redis DB, honor TTL from JWT exp on logout, reject revoked tokens in get_current_user, and add FakeRedis-backed API tests.
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@@ -80,11 +80,11 @@ def blacklist_token(jti: str, exp: float) -> None:
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to ``exp - now`` so the key vanishes when the token would have expired
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naturally.
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"""
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from app.infrastructure.redis_client import get_redis
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from app.infrastructure.redis_client import get_redis_blacklist
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ttl = max(int(exp - datetime.now(timezone.utc).timestamp()), 1)
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try:
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r = get_redis()
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r = get_redis_blacklist()
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r.setex(f"{_BLACKLIST_PREFIX}{jti}", ttl, "1")
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except Exception:
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logger.warning("Failed to blacklist token %s in Redis", jti, exc_info=True)
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@@ -92,10 +92,10 @@ def blacklist_token(jti: str, exp: float) -> None:
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def is_token_blacklisted(jti: str) -> bool:
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"""Return ``True`` if *jti* has been revoked (exists in Redis)."""
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from app.infrastructure.redis_client import get_redis
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from app.infrastructure.redis_client import get_redis_blacklist
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try:
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r = get_redis()
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r = get_redis_blacklist()
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return r.exists(f"{_BLACKLIST_PREFIX}{jti}") > 0
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except Exception:
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logger.warning("Failed to check blacklist for %s in Redis", jti, exc_info=True)
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@@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ from fastapi.security import OAuth2PasswordBearer
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from jose import JWTError, jwt
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from sqlalchemy.orm import Session
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from app.auth import is_token_blacklisted
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from app import auth as auth_lib
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from app.config import settings
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from app.database import get_db
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from app.models.user import User
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@@ -57,6 +57,11 @@ async def get_current_user(
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detail="Could not validate credentials",
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headers={"WWW-Authenticate": "Bearer"},
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)
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revoked_exception = HTTPException(
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status_code=status.HTTP_401_UNAUTHORIZED,
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detail="Token has been revoked",
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headers={"WWW-Authenticate": "Bearer"},
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)
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# Prefer cookie, fall back to header
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token = aegis_token or bearer_token
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@@ -74,8 +79,8 @@ async def get_current_user(
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raise credentials_exception
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# Check token blacklist (revoked tokens)
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jti: str | None = payload.get("jti")
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if jti and is_token_blacklisted(jti):
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raise credentials_exception
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if jti and auth_lib.is_token_blacklisted(jti):
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raise revoked_exception
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except JWTError:
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raise credentials_exception
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@@ -96,13 +96,26 @@ def logout(
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The token's ``jti`` is added to the Redis blacklist so it cannot
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be reused even if the cookie has already been copied elsewhere.
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The blacklist entry auto-expires when the token's ``exp`` is reached.
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When both HttpOnly cookie and ``Authorization: Bearer`` are present
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(typical for API clients), **both** are revoked so the session cannot
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survive on whichever credential the next request prefers.
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"""
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# Attempt to blacklist the token's jti
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token = aegis_token or request.headers.get("Authorization", "").removeprefix("Bearer ").strip()
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if token:
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bearer = (
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request.headers.get("Authorization")
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or request.headers.get("authorization")
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or ""
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)
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bearer = bearer.removeprefix("Bearer ").removeprefix("bearer ").strip()
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seen: set[str] = set()
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for raw in (aegis_token, bearer):
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if not raw or raw in seen:
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continue
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seen.add(raw)
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try:
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payload = jwt.decode(
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token,
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raw,
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settings.SECRET_KEY,
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algorithms=[settings.ALGORITHM],
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)
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@@ -111,7 +124,7 @@ def logout(
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if jti:
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blacklist_token(jti, float(exp))
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except JWTError:
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pass # token already invalid — nothing to revoke
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pass # token already invalid — nothing to revoke for this raw value
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response.delete_cookie(
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key=_COOKIE_NAME,
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@@ -80,12 +80,37 @@ def db():
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@pytest.fixture(scope="function")
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def client(db):
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def client(db, monkeypatch):
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"""Create a test client with database override.
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Imports ``app.main`` lazily to avoid pulling in boto3 / APScheduler
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when only the ``db`` fixture is needed.
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MinIO and the background scheduler are no-ops here so tests do not
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require Docker services for application startup.
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JWT blacklist uses an in-memory FakeRedis so tests do not require a
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real Redis instance.
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"""
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import fakeredis
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_fake_redis = fakeredis.FakeRedis(decode_responses=True)
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def _blacklist_conn():
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return _fake_redis
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monkeypatch.setattr(
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"app.infrastructure.redis_client.get_redis_blacklist",
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_blacklist_conn,
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)
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monkeypatch.setattr("app.main.ensure_bucket_exists", lambda: None)
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monkeypatch.setattr("app.main.start_scheduler", lambda: None)
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monkeypatch.setattr(
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"app.main.scheduler.shutdown",
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lambda wait=False: None,
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)
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from app.main import app
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from app.database import get_db
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import app.database as _db_mod
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@@ -118,6 +143,7 @@ def admin_user(db):
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hashed_password=hash_password("admin123"),
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role="admin",
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is_active=True,
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must_change_password=False,
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)
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db.add(user)
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db.commit()
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@@ -134,6 +160,7 @@ def red_tech_user(db):
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hashed_password=hash_password("redtech123"),
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role="red_tech",
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is_active=True,
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must_change_password=False,
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)
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db.add(user)
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db.commit()
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@@ -150,6 +177,7 @@ def blue_tech_user(db):
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hashed_password=hash_password("bluetech123"),
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role="blue_tech",
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is_active=True,
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must_change_password=False,
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)
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db.add(user)
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db.commit()
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@@ -166,6 +194,7 @@ def red_lead_user(db):
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hashed_password=hash_password("redlead123"),
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role="red_lead",
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is_active=True,
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must_change_password=False,
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)
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db.add(user)
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db.commit()
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@@ -182,6 +211,7 @@ def blue_lead_user(db):
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hashed_password=hash_password("bluelead123"),
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role="blue_lead",
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is_active=True,
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must_change_password=False,
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)
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db.add(user)
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db.commit()
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@@ -79,3 +79,46 @@ def test_get_me_invalid_token(client):
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headers={"Authorization": "Bearer invalidtoken"},
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)
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assert response.status_code == 401
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def test_logout_revokes_token(client, admin_user):
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"""After logout, the same JWT must be rejected (Redis blacklist).
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Prefer Authorization over the HttpOnly cookie so logout blacklists the
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same token the client sends on the next request; clear cookies to avoid
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stale jar state across calls.
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"""
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login = client.post(
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"/api/v1/auth/login",
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data={"username": "admin", "password": "admin123"},
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)
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assert login.status_code == 200
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token = login.json()["access_token"]
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client.cookies.clear()
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out = client.post(
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"/api/v1/auth/logout",
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headers={"Authorization": f"Bearer {token}"},
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)
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assert out.status_code == 200
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from jose import jwt
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from app.config import settings
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from app.infrastructure.redis_client import get_redis_blacklist
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payload = jwt.decode(
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token, settings.SECRET_KEY, algorithms=[settings.ALGORITHM],
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)
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jti = payload.get("jti")
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assert jti
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assert get_redis_blacklist().exists(f"blacklist:{jti}")
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client.cookies.clear()
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assert not len(client.cookies), "cookie jar must be empty to force Authorization Bearer"
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me = client.get(
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"/api/v1/auth/me",
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headers={"Authorization": f"Bearer {token}"},
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)
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assert me.status_code == 401
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assert me.json()["detail"] == "Token has been revoked"
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